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INTRODUCTION
Recently, patents on human genes, software, and business methods have
stoked a heated public discussion on patent law. Much of that discussion has
focused on the doctrine of patent eligibility, or patentable subject matter, a
century-and-a-half old legal doctrine that limits the types of inventions that
can be patented. ' The doctrine currently prohibits patents on "laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas," as well as "products of
nature."2 Courts and commentators have long viewed these phrases as
legalistic terms of art. That is, terms that have, or should have, particular
legal significance apart from a scientific or philosophical exegesis of the
words themselves.3 But there is good reason to doubt this assumption. Since
patent eligibility's inception, the Supreme Court has never provided a
concrete definition or a

legal test for what makes a

natural "law,"

"phenomenon," or "product." Rather, it has tethered patent eligibility's

1.
See, e.g., Ed Black, Op-Ed., Patent Reform Will Remove the Breaks from Innovation, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS (Mar. 15, 2009, 8:00 PM), http://perma.cc/YFgS-BLQK ("The only real
solution is to raise the basic standard of what is a patentable invention."); Editorial, Congress, Not
Courts, Must Fix Flaws in Gene-Patent System, BOSTON.COM (Nov. 21, 2010), http://perma.cc/
Q826-Q7QK ("Perhaps the best policy would be to simply do away with [genel patents.");
Editorial, Patently Ridiculous, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2006), http://perma.cc/GA9R-NTLZ ("The
definition of what is patentable has slowly evolved to include business practices and broad
ideas."); Editorial, Reining in Patents, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2010), http://perma.cc/PH9V-EKSQ
("Underlying many of these disputes is a fundamental question about what patents should
cover.").
2. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (lg81) ("Excluded from such patent protection
are laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas."); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.s.
303, 313 (lg80) ("Congress thus recognized that the relevant distinction was not between
living and inanimate things, but between products of nature, whether living or not, and humanmade inventions.").
3. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency, 47 WM. & MARyL. REv. 371 (2005)
(viewing patentable subject matter as a function of "inherency"); Tun:Jen Chiang, The Rules and
Standards of Patentable Subject Matter, 2010 WIS. L. REv. 1353 (dividing patent eligibility into
easier "rules" and more difficult "standards"); Dennis Crouch & Robert P. Merges, operating
Efficiently Post-Bilski by Ordering Patent Doctrine Decision-Making, 25 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 1673
(2010) (attempting to simplify patent eligibility through decision ordering); Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Wisdom of the Ages or Dead-Hand Control? Patentable Subject Matter for Diagnostic Methods
After In Re Bilski, 3 CAsE W. REs. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET I, 50-64 (2012) (describing patent
eligibility through three normative functions); John M. Golden, Patentable Subject Matter and
Institutional Choice, 89 TEX. L. REv. 1041, 1079 (2011) ("[Tlhe real concern seems to be that
the sCH:alled laws of nature cited by the Supreme Court are 'abstract ideas'-generalized
descriptions untethered to any particular, practical ends."); Eileen M. Kane, Patent Ineligibility:
Maintaining a Scientific Public Domain, 80 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 519, 551 (2006) ("It appears that
'law of nature' in patent law can be called a term of art ... ."); Mark A. Lemley et aI., Life After
Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REv. 1315, 1332-35 (2011) (tying patent eligibility to claim scope); Michael
Risch, Everything Is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REv. 591 (2008) (arguing that the other
requirements for patentability, such as enablement, nonobviousness, and novelty, in total,
satisfy the doctrine of patent eligibility); Katherine J. Strandburg, Much Ado About Preemption, 50
Hous. L. REv. 563, 56g-86 (2012) (describing and criticizing patent eligibility as a test of
"preemption") .
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"natural" terms to a varied list of scientific tropes in an apparent attempt to
extract a scientific or philosophical meaning from them. 4
This disconnect between how courts and scholars view patent
eligibility's "natural" terms and how they analogize them to the real world
has contributed to the doctrine's lack of either consistency or clarity.s
Virtually no cases or legal scholarship have focused on what these terms
mean in a scientific or philosophical context-that is, what science considers
to be a "law of nature," whether a phenomenon is "natural," or when a
product is "of nature."6 And none have discussed whether these meanings
have changed since patent eligibility's inception over 150 years ago. This
Article shows how one branch of scientific philosophy-natural
complexity-both illuminates and challenges the doctrine of patent
eligibility and can be harnessed to ultimately simplify it.
Originally concerned with the ills of overbroad patents, early American
and British decisions on patent eligibility concerned the prohibition of
patenting "principles" or "abstractions," as opposed to their concrete
applications. 7 This test, despite its difficulties, was a decidedly legalistic one,
and the few references to "laws of nature" were simple shorthands for
"principles."B In 1948, however, the Supreme Court, in Funk Brothers Seed Co.

4. See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293
(2012) (giving, as examples of "laws of nature" or "natural phenomena," "a new mineral
discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild," the equation E=mc', and "the law of
gravity" (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Lab. Corp.
of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126-27 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(listing electromagnetism, steam, "the heat of the sun, electricity, [andl the qualities of metals"
(quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (citing O'Reilly
v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 116 (1853)))).
5. See MySpace, Inc. v. CraphOn Corp., 672 F'3d 1250, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (declaring
patentable subject matter a "swamp of verbiage" and a "murky morass"); Chiang, supra note 3,
at 1354-55 ("[Tlhe doctrines on patentable subject matter are difficult to apply."); Risch, supra
note 3, at 591 (characterizing patent eligibility as the "confused and inconsistent jurisprudence
of patentable subject matter"); Strandburg, supra note 3, at 566-67 ("The precise reasons for
[patentable subject matterJ exclusions have been left murky, however, frustrating their
implementation and often leading to incoherence in courts' reasoning about whether claims
are too abstract or too 'natural' to be patentable.").
6. But see, e.g., Golden, supra note 3, at 1079 (proposing that the doctrine only concern
itself with prohibiting "abstract ideas" as a way of circumventing philosophical concerns
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Kane, supra note 3, at 551 (writing that, despite
philosophical debates over terms like "laws of nature," "lilt appears that 'law of nature' in
patent law can be called a term of art").
7 . See infra Part I.A.
8. See Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 726-27 (1880) (quoting O'Reilly v. Morse in
support of sustaining a patent directed to a process of treating fats and oils); O'Reilly, 56 U.S.
(15 How.) at 119 ("And it make. no difference, in this respect, whether the effect is produced
by chemical agency or combination; or by the application of discoveries or principles in natural
philosophy known or unknown before his invention; or by machinery acting altogether upon
mechanical principles. In either case he must describe the manner and process as above
mentioned, and the end it accomplishes."); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175
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v. Kalo Inoculant Co., separately proscribed patents on "laws of nature" or
"natural phenomena."9 And around the same time, courts also began to
incorporate patent law's long-standing ban on patenting "products of
nature" into this reimagined doctrine of patent eligibility.'o
Since then, the Supreme Court has struggled to give these "natural"
terms any concrete, legal meaning. l l Unlike its jurisprudence in other areas
of the law that similarly struggle with vague terms, the Court has devised no
framework, no factors, and no legal definition to discern them.'" Rather, the
Court's opinions have continually relied on a list of putative examples of
natural "laws," "phenomena," and "products," such as electricity, the
qualities of metals, or wild plants. 's In this way, patent eligibility's "natural"
terms have shifted from legal descriptions to philosophical or scientific
concepts.

(1852) ("A patent will be good, though the subject of the patent consists in the discovery of a
great, general, and most comprehensive principle in science or law of nature, if that principle is
by the specification applied to any special purpose, so as thereby to effectuate a practical result
and benefit not previously attained." (quoting Househill Coal & Iron Co. v. Nielson, (1843) 8
Eng. Rep. 616 (H.L.); I Web. P.C. 673, 683)).
9. Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130 ("[P)atents cannot issue for the discovery of the
phenomena of nature .... [T)he heat of the sun, electricity, or the qualities of metals, are part
of the storehouse of knowledge of all men. They are manifestations of laws of nature, free to all
men and reserved exclusively to none. He who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of
nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the law recognizes." (citation omitted)); see also
Ted Sichelman, Funk Forward, in INTELLEGrUAL PROPER1Y AT THE EDGE: THE CONTESTED
CONTOURS OF IP (Rochelle Dreyfuss et al. eds., forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstracUd=2035027 (discussing the effect of Funk Brothers on
patent eligibility's "natural" terms).
10. See Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911) (allowing, as
patent eligible, an "isolated" and "purified" form of adrenaline), affd in part, rev'd in part, 196 F.
496 (2d Cir. 1912); Christopher Beauchamp, Patenting Nature: A Problem of History, 16 STAN.
TECH. 1. REv. 257, 300-06 (2013) (tracing the historical .incorporation of the "products of
nature" doctrine into the doctrine of patent eligibility).
11.
See Chiang, supra note 3, at 1389 ("The label 'laws of nature' is, like the label 'abstract
idea,' infinitely malleable and thus conclusory."); Sichelman, supra note 9, at 2 (" [T) horny and
problematic legal issues in today's case law are reflected by the Funk Brothers decision itself.
Indeed, I argue that the misguided reasoning of the Funk Brothers majority opinion-which
declared the bacteria mixture ineligible for patenting-continues to plague patentable subject
matter jurisprudence. ").
12.
See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167,
180-81 (2000) (providing an analytical framework for assessing the existence of a "case or
controversy" under the Constitution); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 839-40 (1994)
(defining "deliberate indifference," for purposes of "cruel and unusual" punishment under the
Eighth Amendment, as "subjective recklessness ... a familiar and workable standard" in
criminal law); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (articulating
personal jUrisdiction's requirement of "fair play and substantial justice" as encompassing several
factors, including "the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum State, and the
plaintiffs interest in obtaining relief').
13. See supra note +
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Unsurprisingly, recent technologies have tested courts' abilities to
provide coherency to this concept of "nature" in patent eligibility.'4 The
results, so far, have been less than satisfactory.'5 Some of this difficulty comes
from the scientific advances since patent eligibility'S inception 150 years ago.
Spurred by revolutions in the sciences, the past century-and-a-half witnessed
an explosive increase in the amount and diversity of information about the
natural world. ,6 Beginning in the 1940s, this increase became the object of
scientific and philosophical inquiry.'7 Scientists began to take note of "the
number and variety of [nature's] constituent elements and of the
elaborateness of their interrelational structure."18 At the same time,
philosophers began to describe the cognitive difficulties that this increase in
information posed for reducing nature to simplistic descriptions. '9 "More,"
it turned out, was different.· o This view of information's effect on science
developed into a theory of "natural complexity."" In particular, scientific
philosophers realized that natural complexity complicated efforts to
describe nature with either constancy or causality, attenuated the force of
certain conclusions derived from StatIStiCS, and caused "emergent
properties" to appear that could not be construed as fundamental natural
"laws" or "phenomena."" Simply put, natural complexity made using terms
like "laws of nature," "natural phenomena," or "products of nature" harder
to justify and more difficult to define.
The uncertainties that natural complexity imparts on patent eligibility'S
"natural" terms therefore explain some of the problems with the current

14. See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111
(2013) (assessing gene patents); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct.
1289, 1294 (2012) (assessing the patent eligibility of medical diagnostics).
15. See Robert R. Sachs, Punishing Prometheus: The Supreme Court's Blunders in Mayo v.
Prometheus, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 26, 2012, 8:10 AM), http://perma.cc/3LHW-Q\J'3 ("Like so
many pseudo-sciences in which every phenomenon can be rationalized and in which there is no
test that can show the theory to be incorrect, under Prometheus seemingly anything can be
'explained' as being unpatentable subject matter.").
16. See NICHOLAS RESCHER, COMPLEXIIT: A PHILOSOPHICAL OVERVIEW 75-77 (1998)
(describing the growth of scientific research, information, spending, and facilities).
17. See generally Warren Weaver, Science and Complexity, 36 AM. SCIENTIST 536, 538 (1948)
(discussing the implications for the scientific study of systems "in which the number of variables
is very large, and one in which each of the many variables has a behavior which is individually
erratic, or perhaps totally unknown").
18. See RESCHER, supra note 16, at I.
19. See id. at 87 ("[TJhe increasing resource requirement for digging into ever deeper
layers of complexity is such that successive triumphs in our cognitive struggles with nature are
only to be gained at an increasingly greater price. The world's inherent complexity renders the
task of its cognitive penetration increasingly demanding and difficult. The process at issue with
the growth of scientific knowledge in our complex world is one of drastically diminishing
returns.").
20. P.W. Anderson, More Is DifJerent, 177 SCIENCE 393 (197 2).
2 I. See RESCHER, supra note 16, at 25-54 (discussing natural complexity).
22.
See infra Part II.
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doctrine. First, patent eligibility struggles to equivalently exclude all claims
encompassing a natural "law," "phenomena," or "product," even though
natural complexity demonstrates that such concepts occupy a varied
spectrum of both scope and depth. Second, without the ability to precisely
delineate which patent claim elements encompass natural "laws,"
"phenomena," or "products," the Supreme Court has incorrectly
marginalized the importance of claim language in assessing patent
eligibility. And third, although patent law prides itself on being "technology
neutral," the uncertainties facing patent eligibility's "natural" terms give
their application an unwanted technology-specific effect. 2 3
These difficulties suggest that patent eligibility's "natural" terms should
be abandoned. In their place, courts should rely on a descriptive legal
framework to assess patent eligibility. Constructing such a framework proves
difficult, however, because patent eligibility has itself become complex: the
doctrine must now contend with more, and more varied, precedent, patents,
and technologies than ever before. 2 4 In the sciences, descriptive frameworks
to naturally complex systems are often created through the twin strategies of
"decomposition," breaking down a system into cognitively simple subparts,
and "localization," the mapping of each of those subparts to the goals or
purpose of the system. 25 This occurs in the law as well, through the use of
"multiprong" or "multifactor" analyses. 26 For patent eligibility, a cognitively
simple yet robust analysis could be developed by breaking down the
component parts of a typical patent-the claims and the specification-and
by mapping these components to the policy goals of patent eligibility. This,
or a similar analysis, would bring much-needed clarity to patent eligibility
despite the complexities of both science and the law.

23. See infra Part III.
24. See generallyJohn R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the United States
Patent System, 82 B.U. L. REv. 77 (2002) (examining the recent increase in the complexity of the
patent system).
25. See generally WILLIAM BECHTEL & ROBERT C. RICHARDSON, DISCOVERING COMPLEXI1Y:
DECOMPOSITION AND LOCALIZATION AS STRATEGIES IN SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH xxviii-xxxvii (MIT
Press ed. 2010) (2000) (describing decomposition and localization in scientific practice).
26. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167,
180-81 (2000) (providing a multiprong analysis for standing); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.
Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (articulating a set of factors to assess personal
jurisdiction); Lemley et aI., supra note 3, at 1341 (proposing five factors to identify "abstract
ideas" in patent eligibility); Sichelman, supra note g, at 15-17 (applying a similar set of factors
to rectify Mayo and Myriall); see also William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, g8 YALE LJ.
221, 2go-g1 (lg88) ("The solution [to the generality problem in standing is] to break down
what might appear to be a single, general question into discrete and particular questions. In
seeking to determine whether a particular plaintiff has standing, we should ask, as a question of
law on the merits, whether the plaintiff has the right to enforce the particular legal duty in
question. Standing, if seen in this fashion, is a question of substantive law, and the answers to
standing questions will vary as the substantive law varies. ").
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This Article recounts the development of patent eligibility's "natural"
terms, explains how natural complexity complicates this terminology and
patent eligibility, generally, and proposes a method to solve these problems.
Part I traces the doctrine of patent eligibility from its inception as a rule
against patenting "principles" to today's prohibition on patenting "laws of
nature," "natural phenomena," and "products of nature." Part II discusses
how natural complexity imparts cognitive difficulties in developing and
defining patent eligibility'S "natural" terms. And Part III explains these
difficulties' roles in some of the problems present in today's patent eligibility
determinations. Part IV attempts to solve these difficulties: it posits that
patent eligibility has itself become complex, and builds on the complexity
literature to propose a solution; it describes how science employs the
strategies of decomposition and localization to describe complex systems;
and it uses this framework to develop a similar test for patent eligibility.
1.

THE LAw AND SCIENCE OF PATENT ELlGIBILllY

The Constitution authorizes Congress "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries,"27
i.e., to grant patents.2 8 Since 1790, Congress has exercised this authority by
statute and "fixed the conditions upon which patents and copyrights shall be
granted."2 9 The subject matter eligible for patenting is now codified in § 101
of the patent statute: "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof."3 This
liberal definition of "Writings and Discoveries" has changed little in over
200 years,3 1 and "embodie[s the] philosophy that 'ingenuity should receive a
liberal encouragement. "'3 2
Yet liberality is not limitless. Section 101, as interpreted by the Supreme
Court, has long excluded various forms of inventions from patent eligibility.
0

27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 8.
28. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 228-29 (1964) ("Pursuant to this
constitutional authority, Congress in 1790 enacted the first federal patent and copyright law,
and ever since that time has fixed the conditions upon which patents and copyrights shall be
granted." (citations omitted)).
29. [d.
30. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
31. Compare Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § I, I Stat. 109, 109-12 (repealed 1793) (allowing
patents for "any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement
therein"), with Patent Act of 1793, ch. II, § I, I Stat. 318, 318-23 (repealed 1836) (allowing
patents for "any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter"), and
Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117 (repealed 1952) (same), and Patent Act of 1952,
ch. 950, § 101, 66 Stat. 792 (changing "art" to "process" to read "any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter") , and 35 U.S.C. § 101 (same).
32. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (quoting 5 WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 75-76 (Washington ed. 1871)).
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Such efforts began humbly, as attempts to avoid the ills of patent
applications on "principles" or "abstractions," rather than inventions.33 The
modem doctrine, however, has since grown wildly. Today, in addition to
"abstract ideas," the doctrine of patent eligibility also excludes "laws of
nature," "natural phenomena," and "products of nature."34 This has been a
change in kind as well as degree. While the bar struggled to determine what
precisely constituted a "principle" or an "abstraction," its difficulties were
legalistic ones. 35 The difficulties inherent in defining "laws of nature,"
"natural phenomena," and "products of nature," however, have had a
decidedly scientific or philosophical feel. Indeed, rather than articulating
any precise factors to determine what constitutes natural "laws,"
"phenomena," or "products," the Court has tethered those terms to
scientific rather than legal concepts.36 Understanding patent eligibility's
"natural" terms, therefore, requires a historical understanding of the
doctrine as a fundamental shift from law to scientific philosophy.

33. See O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 116 (1853) ("[TJhe discovery of a
principle in natural philosophy or physical science, is not patentable."); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55
U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852) ("A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an
original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an
exclusive right.").
34· Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (lg81) ("Excluded from such patent protection
are laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas."); Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 313
("Congress thus recognized that the relevant distinction was not between living and inanimate
things, but between products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made inventions.").
35. See GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL
INVENTIONS: As ENACTED AND ADMINISTERED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, at xxviii-xxix
(The Lawbook Exch., Ltd., 4th ed. 2005) (1873) ("When it has been laid down that a
'principle,'-meaning by this use of the term a law of nature, or a general property of matter,
or rule of abstract science,---<:annot be the subject of a patent, the doctrine, rightly understood,
asserts only that a law, property, or rule cannot, in the abstract, be appropriated by any
man ... unless the variation of means, apparatus, method, form, or arrangement of matter
introduces some new law, or creates some new characteristic, which produces or constitutes a
substantially different result."); S.H.H., Patenting a Principle, 16 AM. L. REG. 12g, 129-30 (1868)
("The opinions of professional men are far from being settled, apparently, upon all the
questions involved in patenting a principle.... Several things have contributed to this
discordance of sentiment. One of the most prominent is a misapprehension of the effect and
bearing of some of the cases on the subject.").
36. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 128g, 12g3 (2012)
("[TJhe Court has written that a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in
the wild is not patentable subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated law
that E=mc'; nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity." (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.
at 309) (internal quotation marks omitted»; Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs.,
Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126-27 (2006) (Breyer, j., dissenting) ("Neither can one patent 'a novel
and useful mathematical formula,' the motive power of electromagnetism or steam, 'the heat of
the sun, electricity, or the qualities of metals.'" (citations omitted»; Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185
(quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309).
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THE EARLY RUlE AGAINST PATENTING ''PRINCIPLES''

In 1790, Congress modeled the first patent statute in the U.S. after the
British Statute of Monopolies.37 More expansive than the British Statute,
which allowed only "manufactures" to be patented,3 8 the Patent Act of 1790
granted an inventor a monopoly for "any useful art, manufacture, engine,
machine, or device."39 Congress updated this language slightly in 1793 to
include "any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of
matter,"40 and has left it virtually unchanged since.4 1
Early American courts heartily adopted the British maxim that patents
"for a principle or function detached from machinery" were void.4 2 In Wyeth
v. Stone, Justice Joseph Story-"one of the architects of American patent
law"43-invalidated a patent for an automated method "to cut ice of a
uniform size," concluding that" [s]uch a claim [was] utterly unmaintainable
in point of law," because "[i] t is a claim for an art or principle in the
abstract, and not for any particular method or machinery."44 Denying
eligibility to the asserted patent prevented monopolizing "a right to cut ice
by all means or methods, or by all or any sort of apparatus, although he is
not the inventor of any or all of such means, methods, or apparatus."45
Justice Story similarly struck down a patent for a method "of communication
of motion from the reed to the yarn beam" in a 100m.46 That patent, too, was
"utterly void, as being an attempt to maintain a patent for an abstract
principle, or for all possible and probable modes whatsoever of such
communication, although they may be invented by others, and substantially
differ from the mode described by the plaintiff in his specification."47 And in
Smith v. Downing, one of the cases concerning the Morse telegraph, the court
clarified that "some expressions may have been used by one or two judges,
which look like a sanction to patenting a principle, yet they are used in the
above sense, of a principle in operation, in the manner set out in the
specification."48
37. John F. DuffY, Inventing Invention: A Case Study of Legal Innovation, 86 TEX. L. REv. I,
34-36 (2°°7)·
38. Statute of Monopolies, 1623,21 Jac., c. 3, § 6 (Eng.) (allowing patents for only the
"working or makinge of any manner of new Manufactures within this Realme, to the true and
first Inventor and Inventors of such Manufactures").
39. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § I, I Stat. 109, 110 (repealed 1793)·
40. Patent Act of 1793, ch. II, § I, 1 Stat. 318, 319 (repealed IS36).
41. See supra note 31.
42. Blanchard v. Sprague, 3 F. Cas. 648,65° (C.C.D. Mass. IS39) (No. 15IS).
43. Frank D. Prager, The Influence of Mr. Justice Story on American Patent Law, 5 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 254, 254 (1961).
44. Wyeth v. Stone, 30 F. Cas. 723, 727 (C.C.D. Mass. IS40) (No. IS,107).
45. [d.
4 6 . Stone v. Sprague, 23 F. Cas. 161, 162 (C.C.D.R.1. IS40) (No. 13,487).
[d.

Smith v. Downing, 22 F. Cas. 511,514 (C.C.D. Mass. 1850) (No. 13,°36).
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In 1852, in Le Roy v. Tatham, the Supreme Court accepted the analysis
that a "principle," alone, could not be patented. 49 The Court assessed a
process patent concerning the manufacture of metal pipes under
continuous heat and pressure. 50 The patent claimed the manufacturing
process "in the manner set forth [in the patent], or in any other manner
substantially the same."s· Although the case did not discuss whether it was
the subject of a patent, the Court nonetheless concurred that "a principle is
not patentable."5 2 But it also recognized that "[t]he word principle is
used ... with such a want of precision in its application, as to mislead,"53 and
attempted to define the term as "a fundamental truth; an original cause; a
motive."S4 "[T]hese," the Court concluded, "cannot be patented, as no one
can claim in either of them an exclusive right. Nor can an exclusive right
exist to a new power, should one be discovered in addition to those already
known."55 Nonetheless, the Court agreed that:
[a] patent will be good, though the subject of the patent consists in
the discovery of a great, general, and most comprehensive
principle in science or law of nature, if that principle is by the
specification applied to any special purpose, so as thereby to
effectuate a practical result and benefit not previously attained.5 6
The Court reaffirmed the specific-application reasoning the following
year in O'Reilly v. Morse, the seminal Morse telegraph case, striking down one
of Morse's claims for "the use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic
current ... however developed for marking or printing intelligible
characters, signs, or letters, at any distances."57 The claim did "not confine
[itself] to the machinery or parts of machinery ... [but] a monopoly in its
use, however developed, for the purpose of printing at a distance."5 8 Such a
monopoly was too broad-it impeded, rather than promoted the
constitutional directive concerning the "Progress of Science."59 As such, the
Court invalidated claim 8 of Morse's patent because it prevented "some
future inventor, in the onward march of science, [from] discover[ing] a

49.

Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156,175 (1852).
[d. at 172-73.
51. [d. at 172 (internal quotation marks omitted).
52. [d. at 175.
53· [d. at 174.
54· [d. at 175.
55· [d.
56. [d. (quoting Househill Coal & Iron Co. v. Nielson, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 616 (H.L.);
1 Web. P.C. 673, 683) (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112 (1853).
58. [d. at 113.
59. See U.S. CONST. an. I, § 8, cl. 8 (describing Congress's power "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
50.
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mode of writin'g or printing at a distance by means of the electric or galvanic
current, without using any part of the process or combination set forth in
the plaintiff's specification."60
This connection between "principle" and claim scope seemed to also
extend to compositions of matter, as well as machines and processes. In
Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co.,judge Learned Hand famously upheld
a patent directed to adrenaline. 61 Although the chemical was no different
from how it was found in the adrenal gland, the court concluded that the act
of isolating and purifying the chemical from its natural surroundings was "a
purification of the principle, [for] it became for every practical purpose a
new thing commercially and therapeutically."62 This made "[t]he purpose of
the claims ... quite clear ... with a corresponding limitation of scope. "63
Rather than focus on issues of science or philosophy, scholars have
since described these cases as concerning "overbreadth"-whether the
patents attempted to claim more than they invented. 64 And indeed,
Supreme Court decisions soon after Le Roy and O'Reilly bear out this logic. 65
Defining "principles" or "abstractions," therefore, was a purely legal exercise
tied to the scope of patents' claims relative to their disclosure. Reduced to a
simple syllogism, patent eligibility stood for little more than this: "Applying a
basic scientific principle to the construction of a useful object is patentable;
claiming every use of that principle isn't. "66
B.

fuNK BROTHERS SEED CO. V. KALo INOCULANT CO. AND THE RISE OF PATENT
EUGIBIUTY'S "NATURAL" TERMs

This uniform view against patenting "principles," however, concealed
two greater disputes. First, the advances in science in the early twentieth
century quickly began to erode the assumption that scientific advances
themselves-apart from physical machinery-should not be patent eligible.
60, O'Reilly, 56 U.S. (15 How,) at 113,
61. Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 18g F. 95, 104 (C.C.S.D.N.V Igll), ajfd in
part, rev'dinpart, Ig6 F. 496 (2d Cir. IgI2).
62. [d. at 103.
63. /d. at 109.
64. See Lemley et aI., supra note 3, at 1333-35·
65. E.g., Holland Furniture Co. v. Perkins Glue Co., 277 U.S. 245, 257 (lg28)
(prohibiting a patentee from "claiming a patent on the result or function of a machine [to]
extend his patent to devices or mechanisms not described in the patent"); Minerals Separation,
Ltd. v. Butte & Superior Mining Co., 250 U.S. 336, 349 (lglg) (noting that "the scope of [the
patentees'] right is limited to the means they have devised and described as constituting the
process"); Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 581 (18g8) ("[W]hether
you call Westinghouse's discovery ... a process, or a mode of operation ... if he was the first to
disclose it and to describe a mechanical means to give practical effect to the invention, he must
be regarded as a pioneer inventor, and as entitled to protection .... "); Winans v. Denmead, 56
U.S. (15 How.) 330,341-42 (1853) (patenting "principles" monopolized "any thing which is
matter of common right, [rather than] what [inventors] themselves have created").
66. Lemley et al., supra note 3, at 1334-35.
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Yet scholars struggled to conceive the contours of a potentially new regime.
One commentator noted that "practical difficulties .... [lay in the] primary
importance that the scientific discovery which is to be rewarded be very
carefully defined."67 Another, referring to Einstein's theory of relativity,
recognized "[a] very serious difficulty... in defining what is a newly
discovered 'truth or fact,' as distinguished from the use that can be made of
it in the practical and industrial arts."68 Second, courts and commentators
began to tussle over the level and definition of "inventiveness" required for
patent eligibility. Since 1851, the Supreme Court had required every
invention to "be the product of 'more ingenuity and skill. .. than were
possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business."'6g The
standard-amorphous and unworkable-was ardently condemned.7°
Against this backdrop, agricultural researcher Varley Sherman Bond, in
1938, filed for a patent directed to "a bacterial culture useful for the
inoculation of the seeds of leguminous plants."7 Although the bacteria,
Rhizobia, were well known and widely used in standard agricultural practice,
the patentee had isolated and combined several strains of the bacteria that
did not mutually inhibit one another.,. Because different crops responded
to different strains of Rhizobium, the patentee had, in essence, developed a
single Rhizobium inoculant that could be used for multiple crops.7 3 Rather
than claiming a "one-size-fits-all" inoculant of specific Rhizobium strains, the
patentee extended his claims to all ina cui ants "comprising a plurality of
selected cultures... said cultures being substantially unaffected by each
other."74
In Funk Brothers, the Supreme Court invalidated the patent on the
ground that Bond's inoculant "fell short of invention within the meaning of
the patent statutes."75 In drawing that conclusion, however, the Court did
not rely on its cases assessing the invention's level of "ingenuity" or "skiI1."76
Nor did it reject the patent for being directed to a "principle"-"the idea
1

67.

Hector M. Holmes, Book Review, 45 HARv. L. REv. 1431, 1433 (1932) (reviewing CJ.

HAMSON, PATENT RIGHTS FOR SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERlES (1930)).

68. J. Lewis Stackpole, Book Review, 41 YALE LJ. 941, 941 (1932) (reviewing HAMSON,
supra note 67).
69. See Duffy, supra note 37, at 39 (alteration in original) (quoting Hotchkiss v.
Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 267 (1850)).
70. 'd. at 42-43 (discussing several prominent judges' criticisms of the requirement).
71. U.S. Patent No. 2,200,532 col. 111.2-4 (filed Aug. 24,1938).
72. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 129-30 (1948).
73. 'd. at 130.
74· '53 2 Patent col. 1311.22-27.
75. Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 131-32.
76. See id. at 127-32; see also Duffy, supra note 37, at 39 (discussing Hotchkiss v. Greenwootfs
requirement that inventions encompass "more ingenuity and skill ... than were possessed by an
ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business" (alteration in original) (quoting Hotchkiss v.
Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 267 (1850)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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that there are compatible strains"-rather than an application of one.77
Rather, the Court invalidated the patent on the basis that Bond's invention
was "the work of nature" and that "patents cannot issue for the discovery of
the phenomena of nature."7 8
Unlike its predecessor cases, however, this appeal to "phenomena of
nature" did not simply appear to be legal shorthand. Rather, it appeared to
incorporate some of the scientific and naturalistic mysticism popular at the
time. 79 The Court described Rhizobium's nitrogen-fixing properties as "some
mysterious process,"80 "part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men ....
free to all men and reserved exclusively to none."81 These properties were
"like the heat of the sun, electricity, or the qualities of metals,"82 and
"serve[d] the ends nature originally provided and act[ed] quite
independently of any effort of the patentee."83 Similarly, the Court
characterized Bond's invention as "the handiwork of nature,"84 "nature's
secret,"85 and an "ancient secret[] of nature."86 This language dramatically
departed from the Court's earlier remarks on allowing patents for a "great,
general, and most comprehensive principle in science or law of nature" as
long as the inventor concretely applied them. 87
Both the dissent and the concurrence disputed the majority's notion of
patent eligibility as divorced from the traditional understanding of the rule
against patenting overbroad principles. In dissent, Justices Burton and
Jackson simply did "not agree that the patent issued for such products is
invalid for want of a clear, concise description of how the combinations were
made and used."88 This concern with the patent's description paralleled the
Court's reasoning in O'Reilly that overbroad claims prevented "some future
inventor, in the onward march of science, [from] discover[ing] a mode of
writing or printing at a distance ... without using any part of the process or

77. Funk Bros., 333 u.s. at 133 (Frankfurter,]., concurring).
78. [d. at 130 (majority opinion).
79. See, e.g., Vannevar Bush, As We May Think, ATLANTIC Uuly I, 1945), http://perma.cc/
G7AL-R33Q ("Thus science may implement the ways in which man produces, stores, and
consults the record of the race. It might be striking to outline the instrumentalities of the future
more spectacularly, rather than to stick closely to the methods and elements now known and
undergoing rapid development, as has been done here. Technical difficulties of all sorts have
been ignored, certainly, but also ignored are means as yet unknown which may come any day to
accelerate technical progress as violently as did the advent of the thermionic tube.").
80. Funk Bros., 333 u.S. at 128.
81. !d. at 130.
82. !d.
83. [d. at 131.
84. [d.
85. [d. at 132.
86.

[d.

87·
88.

Le Royv. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156,175 (1852).
Funk Bros., 333 u.S. at 136 (Burton,]., dissenting).
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combination set forth in the plaintiff's specification."89 In concurrence,
Justice Frankfurter agreed as to the invalidity of the patent because the
claims were overbroad: "the phrase 'the claims cover a composite culture'
might mean 'a particular composite culture' or 'any composite culture'"
including those "quite different from Bond's composite culture."90 But
Justice Frankfurter disagreed with the majority's "introduc[tion of] such
terms as 'the work of nature' and the 'laws of nature.' For these are vague
and malleable terms infected with too much ambiguity and equivocation."9 1
In rejecting the scope and vag-Lleness of the majority's choice of language,
Justice Frankfurter voiced a prescient concern: "Everything that happens may
be deemed 'the work of nature' .... "9 2
C.

THE MODERN DOCTRINE OF PA TENT EllCIBILITY AND SCIENTffIC PHILOSOPHY

Justice Frankfurter's axiom was perhaps truer than he realized. Since
Funk Brothers, every Supreme Court opinion to substantively address patent
eligibility has adopted the case's focus on "nature."93 In Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, the Court upheld a patent directed to a bacterium containing
two synthetic pieces of circular DNA, or plasmids. 94 The Court described the
function of these plasmids as giving the bacteria a "property ... possessed by
no naturally occurring bacteria,"95 with "markedly different characteristics
from any found in nature ... and .... not nature's handiwork."9 6 This
distinguished the invention from that in Funk Brothers because the claim
encompassed not "a hitherto unknown natural phenomenon, but... a
nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition of matter. "97
In Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., the Court
considered patents for a method of optimizing the dosage of thiopurine
drugs in treating Crohn's disease patients. 98 The method simply directed a
physician to "administer" the drug to a patient and then "determine" the
level of a metabolite of that drug, where a level above or below certain values
indicated a need to adjust the dosage accordingly.99 Like patents on
"principles" before it, the patents' claims do "not confine [themselves] to
[any] machinery or parts of machinery,"loo but rather sought a monopoly on

89.

O'Reillyv. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1853).

90.

Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 134 (Frankfurter,]., concurring).

91.

Id. at 134-35'
[d. at 135 (emphasis added).
See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,3°5 (1980).
[d.
[d. at 310.
[d. at 309.
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294-95 (2012).
[d. at 1295.
O'Reillyv. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1853).

92.

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
g8.
99.
100.
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any "administration" of thiopurine followed by a "determination" of the
quantity of their metabolites. 101 Nonetheless, the Court invalidated the
patents on the grounds that they "set forth laws of nature."102 The
relationship between thiopurine administration and its metabolites were
"natural laws or natural phenomena," lo 3 "natural responses" that were a
consequence of human biology,104 or "natural correlations" between two
events.105 Prometheus's claims, therefore, were unpatentable natural "laws,"
"phenomena," and "manifestations of nature," even though the Court
recognized that "all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon,
or apply laws of nature [or] natural phenomena. "106
More recently, in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics,
Inc., the Supreme Court considered several patents encompassing two types
of DNA molecules: DNA excised directly from chromosomes, or "isolated
genomic DNA," and synthetic transcripts of only the coding portions of
genes, or "cDNA"107 The opinion framed the issue as whether each class of
molecules was "naturally occurring" or a "product of nature."IOB In its
assessment, the Court heavily focused on the biochemical differences
between isolated genomic DNA and cDNAlOg But it framed the differences
largely in "natural" terms: whether each patented molecule was "naturally
occurring," whether they were variants of "natural DNA," and whether their
sequences were "dictated by nature."IIO These differences counseled against
the patent eligibility of isolated genomic DNA as resulting from activity that
was "not an act ofinvention."111
Even the Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding "abstract ideas"the historical ancestor of "principles"-has recently been infected with such
language. In Gottschalk v. Benson-a case concerning the patentability of a
mathematical formula for processing binary code-the Supreme Court

101.
See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297-9S ("First, the 'administering' step simply refers to the
relevant audience, namely doctors who treat patients with certain diseases with thiopurine
drugs .... Second, the 'wherein' clauses simply tell a doctor about the relevant natural laws, at
most adding a suggestion that he should take those laws into account when treating his
patient. ... Third, the 'determining' step tells the doctor to determine the level of the relevant
metabolites in the blood, through whatever process the doctor or the laboratory wishes to
use .... The upshot is that the three steps simply tell doctors to gather data from which they
may draw an inference in light of the correlations.").
102.
Id. at 1296.
103. Id.
104.
Id. at 1305.
105.
Id. at 1296.
106. Id. at 1293.
107. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013).
lOS. Id.
109. Id.at2114-15·
110. Id. at 2119.
Ill. Id. at 2117.
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rejected the patent's claims as falling afoul of the prohibition on patenting
"phenomena of nature."ll. Similarly, in Parker v. Flook, the Court construed
its previous decisions as "[r] easoning that an algorithm ... is like a law of
nature."ll3 As such, the Court invalidated the patentee's software process
patent "not on the notion that natural phenomena are not processes, but
rather on the more fundamental understanding that they are not ...
'discoveries'" for the Constitution's purposes.l 14 And in Diamond v. Diehr, the
Court upheld the patentees' claims to a computerized process for
automatically curing rubber as "not unpatentable simply because it contains
a law of nature."115 Despite this linguistic shift, the Court, in Bilski v. Kappos
in 2010, boldly suggested that such language had been inherent in the
patent eligibility statute for 150 years. 116
These repeated invocations of natural "laws," "phenomenon," and
"products" have never received any definition from the Supreme Court. The
Court has made no attempt to impart on them any linguistic meaning, e.g.,
explications of the terms' ordinary usage in speech, dictionary definitions,
or historical accounts of their concepts}l7 Nor has it attempted to provide
them with any legal construction-normative judgments as to what natural
"laws," "phenomena," or "products" should mean." S It provides no
framework, no formula, and no list of factors to assess their construction.
Nor does it tie them to historical concerns about descriptive overbreadth in
patenting "principles."ll9 Rather, the Supreme Court has engaged in a
fundamentally different type of analysis: analogies to a list of examples of
what the Court thinks are obvious natural "laws," "phenomena," and
"products." Those include "mineral [s] discovered in the earth," "new
plant[s] found in the wild," the equation E=mc·, gravity, electromagnetism,
steam power, "the heat of the sun, electricity, [and] the qualities of metals,"

112. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67-68 (1972) ("As we stated in [Funk Brothers]' He
who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it
which the law recognizes .... We dealt there with a 'product' claim, while the present case deals
with a 'process' claim. But we think the same principle applies." (citation omitted) (quoting
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948» (internal quotation
marks omitted».
113· Parkerv. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978).
114·
Id. at 593.
115. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981) (quoting Flook, 437 U.S. at 590).
116. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010).
117.
Cf Tun:Jen Chiang & Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction in
Patent Law, 123 YALE LJ. 530, 543-48 (2013) (describing the facets of "interpretation" in claim
construction) .
118.
Cf id. at 549-52.
119.
See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
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among others.'2o This is simply unlike other areas of the Court's
jurisprudence that confront vague terminology in legal rules or standards.' 2.
Patent eligibility's ever-growing list of excluded "sciency things" does
little, if anything, to explain what exactly natural "laws," "phenomena," or
"products" are. Declaring that one cannot patent "E=mc"," for example, does
not tell us why it is a "law" or a "phenomenon," which one of the two it is, or
whether it can be both at the same time. Nor does it begin to resolve the
fundamental problem of distinguishing natural laws from man-made
representations of them.'·2 Assuming that "gravity" must be excluded from
patentable subject matter informs us little about which other scientific
concepts must similarly be excluded. Prohibiting patents on
electromagnetism, electricity, and steam power-even when such powers
result solely from man-made activity-does little to elucidate what, legally,
makes them unpatentable natural "phenomena." And concluding that one
cannot patent wild plants or extracted minerals as "products of nature" does
nothing more than leave that controlling term hopelessly void of meaning.
This list of scientific concepts, therefore, likely serves one particular
function for the Supreme Court: as a collection of concepts that the Court
believes scientists would agree on as natural "laws," "phenomena," and
"products." This understanding seems to explain some of the Court's
language concerning its own difficulties in making patent eligibility
determinations. In his dissent in Laboratory Corp. oj America Holdings v.
Metabolite Laboratories, Inc., Justice Stephen Breyer paused to "concede that

120. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012);
Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126-27 (2006) (Breyer,]',
dissenting) .
121.
See cases cited supra note 12.
122. Kevin Emerson Collins has written extensively on how patentable subject matter's
prohibitions on "laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas" are prohibitions on
man-made representations of "laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas," however
defined. E.g., Kevin Emerson Collins, Bilski and the Ambiguity of "An Unpatentable Abstract Idea, ..
15 LEWIs & CLARK L. REv. 37, 46 (2011) [hereinafter Collins, Bilski and the Ambiguity)
(analogizing patents on abstract ideas to representations of mental phenomena as patents on
drugs are to patents on chemical formulas); Kevin Emerson 'Collins, Prometheus Laboratories,
Mental Steps, and Printed Matter, 50 HOus. L. REv. 391, 395-97 (20 12) (describing how
restrictions on patenting abstract ideas are actually prohibited on representations of abstract ideas
in the context of the printed matter doctrine); Kevin Emerson Collins, Propertizing Thought, 60
SMU L. REv. 317, 329 (2007) (describing patents on abstract ideas as "mental representations
of knowledge").
This issue has also, of course, occupied a central place in the philosophy of science. E.g.,
D.M. ARMSTRONG, WHAT ISA LAw OF NATURE? 13 (1983) ("A gap can open up between law and
manifestation of law." (emphasis added»; NANCY CARTIVRlGHT, How THE LAws OF PHYSICS LIE
129 (1983) ("[N)ature is not governed by simple quantitative equations of the kind we write in
our fundamental theories .... [F)undamental equations do not govern objects in reality; they
govern only objects in models."); Fred I. Dretske, Laws of Nature, 44 PHIL. SCI. 248, 249 n.4
(1977) ("I will also, sometimes, speak of laws and statements of law indifferently. I think,
however, that it is a serious mistake to conflate these two notions." (emphasis added».
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the category of nonpatentable '[p] henomena of nature,' like the categories
of 'mental processes' and 'abstract intellectual concepts,' is not easy to
define." 12 3 Similarly, in Mayo, the Court declined the patent holder's
invitation to discern among different types of natural "laws," not because the
issue may not have been illustrative, but because "[c]ourts and judges are
not institutionally well suited to making the kinds of judgments needed to
distinguish among different laws of nature."124 Mayo's assertion may partially
explain the Court's choice of popularly known scientific developments, such
as electricity and steam power, even when other lesser-known examples from
actually litigated cases, such as the Arrhenius equation in Diehr,'25 remain
available.
Patent eligibility's "natural" terms are, therefore, the Supreme Court's
attempt to introduce a scientific or philosophical meaning into natural
"laws," "phenomena," and "products." It focuses on what the Court believes
science or philosophy considers "laws of nature," "natural phenomena," and
"products of nature." And, like early twentieth-century debates on granting
patents to pure scientific discoveries, it struggles with the difficulties of
distinguishing scientific concepts. 126 Contrary to the doctrine's historical
focus on patenting "principles," patent eligibility's "natural" terms are more
scientific and philosophical than legal.

II.

NATURAL COMPLEXI1Y AND NATURAL LAws, PHENOMENA, AND PRODUCTS

Given the Supreme Court's approach to patent eligibility's "natural"
terms, science or philosophy would appear to be natural sources of
discourse to help crystallize their meanings. After all, "What is a law of
nature?" is a central question for the philosophy of science. 127
Unfortunately, neither science nor philosophy has provided any clarity.
Rather, the issues surrounding the terms' meanings have long been-and
are still-hotly debated. 128 Regularity,
universality, functionality,
probabilism,
necessitation,
and
contingency-all
complicate
a
straightforward definition.'29 At the same time, one avenue of scientific
philosophy centers around these very difficulties: natural complexity.
123.
Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 134 (Breyer,]., dissenting) (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S.
5 8 4,5 8 9 (197 8 )).
124.
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1303.
125. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177-81 (1981). The Arrhenius equation generally
describes the effect of temperature on chemical reaction rates. See Keith ]. Laidler, The
Development of the Arrhenius Equation, 61]' CHEMICAL EDUC. 494, 494 (1984).
126.
See Sichelman, supra note 9, at 10 ("[Sjeparating the 'natural' from the 'synthetic' is
not so simple a task."); supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
127.
See, e.g., philosophy sources cited supra note 122.
128.
See, e.g., philosophy sources cited supra note 122. See generally THE OXFORD COMPANION
TO PHILOSOPHY 506-07 (Ted Honderich ed., 2d ed. 2005) (discussing various philosophical
approaches to defining a "law of nature").
129.
See generally ARMSTRONG, supra note 122.
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Complexity, generally, is the measure of three facets of a system: (1) the
number of elements, or components, present in the system; (2) the variety
of those elements; and (3) the interrelationships between those elements. ' 30
As those facets increase, a system becomes increasingly "complex."13 1 A
simple wristwatch, for example, may contain nothing more than a fixed gear
and a tension spring, turning a single hand. But wristwatches often involve
many more components-several gears and springs, and, often, multiple
measures of time. Those components, in turn, often come in several
varieties, sizes, and shapes. And all of the components are, in one way or
another, interconnected-the absence of a single gear or spring can affect
the performance of many other components, and sometimes fatally SO.'3 2
Such a watch is "complex," in philosophical terms. '33
The principle effect of complexity is cognitive. 134 Complexity hinders
our ability to reduce a system to its component parts, to understand a
system's causes and effects, and to describe or explain a system with either
completeness or certainty.135 Difficulties in understanding how a complex
wristwatch works may arise simply because of difficulties in determining
which components are required, or how the components affect the watch's
movement, either individually or in combination. '36 It may also be difficult
to understand how a complex wristwatch works because we may lack the
words to describe its components or those components' interactions with

130. RESCHER, supra note 16, at 1 (defining one form of complexity as "the number and
variety of an item's constituent elements and of the elaborateness of their interrelational
structure") .
131. See id. at 8-16 (giving examples of increasingly complex systems).
132. This, however, is not always the case in complex systems. One branch of complexity
theory, complex adaptive systems, or CAS, describes how certain complex systems can adapt to
changes in their configuration despite their interconnected nature. See generally John H.
Holland, Complex Adaptive Systems, DAEDALUS, Winter 1992, at 17. J.B. Ruhl has written
numerous articles on how various areas of the law similarly adapt despite their complexity. E.g.,
].B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-and-Society System: A Wake-Up Call
for Legal &ductionism and the Modern Administrative State, 45 DUKE LJ. 849 (1996); ].B. Ruhl,
Law's Complexity: A Primer, 24 GA. ST. V. L. REv. 885 (2008);].8. Ruhl & Harold]. Ruhl,Jr., The
Arrow of the Law in Modern Administrative States: Using Complexity Theory to Reveal the Diminishing
Returns and Increasing Risks the Burgeoning of Law Poses to Society, 30 V.C. DAVIS L. REv. 405
(1997); ].B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and
Society and Its Practical Meaningfor Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REv. 1407 (1996).
133. See HERBERT A. SIMON, THE SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFICIAL 188-90 (3d ed. 1996).
134. See RESCHER, supra note 16, at 16 ("All in all, then, the best overall index we have of a
system's complexity is the extent to which resources (of time, energy, ingenuity) must be
expanded on its cognitive domestication.").
135. See id. at 16-21 (describing the cognitive difficulties with complex systems).
136. See SIMON, supra note 133, at 188-90 (recounting the watchmaker parable).
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one another. 137 We may also simply lack the cognitive operators to
understand the watch as a whole. 38
So, too, with nature. Since 1850, almost every scientific discipline has
seen the introduction, development, and adoption of radical theories and
practices that have changed our understanding of the simplicity--or lack
thereof--of the natural world. Scientists unearthed countless new objects
and forces previously hidden from view: new sub-atomic particles and forces
in physics; DNA and genes in biology; continental plates in earth science;
and more. 13 9 The number of specialties in almost every scientific discipline
multiplied many times over. 14° And through interdisciplinary research,
science has uncovered a network of innumerable interrelationships in
nature. 141 These revolutions, in turn, fed an explosive increase in the
amount of scientific research and information. Since 1850, the quantity and
funding of scientific research has, accordingly, exponentially increased. 1 4 2
The amount of scientific literature is now likely produced at one thousand
times the rate it was then. 143 And so many people now work as professional
scientists that over eighty percent of all the scientists who have ever lived are
living nOW.'44
1

137. See RESCHER, supra note 16, at 14 (discussing cognitive difficulties in ontological
complexity).
138. See id,
139, See 15 CHARLES DARV.1N, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (Paul H, Barrett & RB, Freeman
eds" Pickering & Chatto Ltd. 1988) (1859) (discussing evolution and natural selection); 2
MICHAEL B, GREEN ET AI..., SUPERSTRING THEORY (1987); WERNER HEISENBERG, THE PHYSICAL
PRINCIPLES OF THE QUANTUM THEORY (Carl Eckhart & Frank C, Hoyt trans" 1930); A.A, Penzias
& R, W, Wilson, A Measurement of Excess Antenna Temperature at 4080 Mc/s, 142 AsTROPHYSICAL]'
419 (1965); FJ. Vine & D,H, Matthews, Magnetic Anomalies over Oceanic Ridges, 199 NATURE 947
(1963) (demonstrating the existence of magnetic striations over the seafloor, proof of seafloor
"spreading" and "continental ~rift"); ].D, Watson & F,H,C. Crick, Molecular Structure of Nucleic
Acids: A Structure for Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid, 171 NATURE 737 (1953) (discussing the discovery of
the structure of DNA); Count K.A.H, Marner, Rector, Royal Caroline Inst., Presentation
Speech: Award Ceremony Speech (Dec. 10, 1905), available at http://perma,cc/BZV3-AU6X
(awarding Robert Koch the 1905 Nobel Prize in medicine for his "discover[y of] the causes of
individual diseases," i.e" microbes); see also THOMAS S, KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS I I I (3d ed, 1996) ("[Alfter a revolution scientists are responding to a different
world,"),
140, RESCHER, supra note 16, at 75-77 (recounting the growth and increase in the number
of subdivisions in the sciences),
14!. [d, at 45 (describing how scientific interdisciplinarity "broaden[sl one's notion of a
natural phenomenon to include not just the processes themselves, , , but also the relationships
among them"),
142, See id, at 75-77 (discussing the growth of scientific research),
143, See id, at 76 (computing the rate of production of scientific literature to increase tenfold every fifty years) ,
144, [d,
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Beginning in the 1940s, scientists and philosophers proposed that this
growth was itself extraordinary.'45 In the words of Philip W. Anderson, the
recipient of the 1977 Nobel Prize in physics, "More Is Different."'46 More
scientific information uncovered a vast, varied, and interrelated web of
information that could "not... be understood in terms of a simple
extrapolation of the properties of a few particles."'47 Rather, this increase in
scientific information made it appear that "[a]t each stage [of inquiry]
entirely new laws, concepts, and generalizations [were] necessary" to
theorize the whole. '48 This all implied the radical notion that "[t]he ability
to reduce everything to simple fundamental laws [did] not imply the ability
to start from those laws and reconstruct the universe."'49
These observations gave rise to the study of "natural complexity,"'5 or
the cognitive difficulties with synthesizing how the Earth's "many biological
and physical components interact across all space and time scales."'5 '
Because "natural reality has an infinite descriptive depth,"'52 natural
complexity counsels us to "abandon the idea that our linguistic resources
can-at least in the theoretical long run-fully characterize the descriptive
nature of the real."l53 Thus, the ultimate problem with terms like natural
"laws," "phenomena," and "products" is that such terms "are inevitably
inadequate to explain by themselves the phenomena as we actually observe
them."'54 Three features-constancy and causality, probabilism, and
fundamentalism--demonstrate the terms' inadequacy In describing
naturally complex systems.
0

145. See, e.g., Weaver, supra note 17, at 540 ("These problems-and a wide range of similar
problems in the biological, medical, psychological, economic, and political sciences-are just
too complicated to yield to the old nineteenth-century techniques which were so dramatically
successful on two-, three-, or four-variable problems of simplicity. These new problems,
moreover, cannot be handled with the statistical techniques so effective in describing average
behavior in problems of disorganized complexity.").
146. Anderson, supra note 20, at 393.
147. [d.
148. [d.
149. /d.
150. RESCHER, supra note 16, at 50-52 (summarizing the procession of natural complexity).
151. Nicholas W. Watkins & Mervyn P. Freeman, Natural Complexity, 320 SCIENCE 323, 323
(2008) (describing natural complexity from a geoscience perspective).
152. REsCHER, supra note 16, at 28.
153. [d. at 33. Interestingly, several other scholars have written about the limits of language
in other areas of patent law. See, e.g., Andrew Chin, The Ontological Function of the Patent
Document, 74 U. PITT. L. REv. 293, 299-305 (2012) (describing the limits of language in
defining what constitutes enablement); supra note 122 (citing works by Kevin Emerson Collins
discussing what constitutes an "abstract idea").
154. RESCHER, supra note 16, at 31.
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CONSTANCY AND CAUSAliTY

or "phenomena" classically require

two factors:

(1) constancy, or, as termed by the philosopher David Hume, a "constant
conjunction"; and (2) causality. I;; If event A happens in conjunction with
event B, this is only a "law" or a "phenomenon" if event A always occurs in
conjunction with event B. If, for example, water always boils (event A) when
it is heated to 1000e (event B), then we have satisfied Hume's constancy

requirement. '56 Accidents happen, however. That is, sometimes events
repeatedly, even always, occur in co~unction with one another that have no
causal link between the two. One famous example is the statement,
"Whenever I go to Paris, it rains."'57 Even taking this statement as true-and
therefore, satisfying the Humean constancy requirement-does not make it
a natural "law" because the speaker's presence in Paris is surely not causing it
to rain. ' 58 Rather, the speaker is simply the victim of unerring bad luck and
Paris the host of bad weather.
Separating repetitive accidents from repeatable causal events is the
classical philosophical problem of induction. ' 59 That is, how can we
inductively generalize facts about the world given the epistemological
uncertainty about any two events' constancy and causality? In the classical
school, at least, natural "laws" or "phenomena" are only those pairings of
events that can be inductively determined to be both universally constant and
universally causal. I60 This view of natural laws and phenomena consequently
implies that the terms occupy an immensely broad scope. For a natural
relationship to be a "law" or a "phenomenon" it must "stipulate-quite
ambitiously-how things are always and everywhere.",61
Natural complexity complicates this analysis. As a natural system
becomes more complex, it becomes increasingly difficult to determine
whether any observed natural relationships are either constant or causal. I62

155. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY, supra note 128, at 506 (emphasis omitted).
The twinning of constancy and causality in natural "laws" or "phenomena" is an almost
infinitely rich topic in the philosophy of science. See generally G.E.M. Anscombe, Professor of
Philosophy, Univ. of Cambridge, Inaugural Lecture Before the University of Cambridge (May 6,
1971), in CAUSALITY AND DETERMINATION (1971) (describing the state of the field). The
purpose of this Subpart, however, is to simply describe the prevailing, classical view of constancy
and causality.
156. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY, supra note 128, at 506.
157. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
158. See id.
159. For a brief account of the traditional problem of induction, see MARIo BUNGE,
CAUSALITY AND MODERN SCIENCE 251-55 (Transaction Publishers 4th ed. 2009) (1959).
160.
But see NANCY CARTWRIGHT, THE DAPPLED WORLD: A STUDY OF THE BOUNDARIES OF
SCIENCE 148-49 (1999) (criticizing this view).
161. RESCHER, supra note 16, at 65.
162.
See Anderson, supra note 20, at 393 ("The constructionist hypothesis breaks down
when confronted with the twin difficulties of scale and complexity. The behavior of large and
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As the number, variety, and interconnectedness of elements in a system
increases, determining which elements cause which events becomes a much
harder task. Isolating and identifying not simply which elements are
responsible for a particular natural phenomenon, but which interactions of
those elements give rise to it greatly hinders our ability to distill what causes a
particular phenomenon. This hindrance ultimately means that in naturally
complex systems "there may often be no way of telling whether something
proposed as a cause of some effect was in fact required for the occurrence of
that effect." 163 Which cellular factors contribute to cancer, for example, is a
famously complex question "that is already complex almost beyond
measure." 164 As a result, even the best attempts by researchers to reduce
cancer to several causal or constant "hallmarks" have generally failed. 165
Natural "laws" or "phenomena" of cancer simply elide over research's ability
to "add[] further layers of complexity."166
In other instances, constancy and causality may exist at one level of
complexity, but vanish entirely at another. Newton's law of universal
gravitation, for example, describes the relationship between two objects'
mass and distance and the gravitational force between them. 167 But it is both

complex aggregates of elementary particles, it turns out, is not to be understood in terms of a
simple extrapolation of the properties of a few particles."); see also CAR1WRIGHT, supra note 160,
at 25-26 (discussing how complexity makes problematic "treating a real situation [by) ...
piec[ing) together a model from these fixed components"); JOHN DUPRE, THE DISORDER OF
THINGS: METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE DISUNITY OF SCIENCE 103 (1993) ("I suspect that
the complex interdependencies of entities at many different levels of structural complexity
characteristic of biology is sufficient to show the implausibility of the reductionistic project.").
163. DUPRE, supra note 162, atl84.
164. Douglas Hanahan & Robert A. Weinberg, The Hallmarks of Cancer, 100 CELL 57, 57
(2000); see also CAR1WRIGHT, supra note 160, at 17-18 (discussing this in the philosophy of
science context).
165. In their famous paper in 2000, notable cancer researchers Douglas Hanahan and
Robert A. Weinberg proposed reducing cancer to six cellular "hallmarks" that appeared to be
present in almost all cancers. Hanahan & Weinberg, supra note 164, at 57. But this attempt to
impose constancy on a complex natural system eventually gave way; ironically, Hanahan and
Weinberg's "hallmark" principle has itself "complexified'" Since its publication, the authors
have added two more hallmarks, while other scientists have noted that many of the hallmarks
apply to noncancerous tumors, as well. Douglas Hanahan & Robert A. Weinberg, Hallmarks of
Cancer: The Next Generation, 144 CELL 646 (2011) (adding additional hallmarks); see also
Sebastien L. Floor et aJ., Hallmarks of Cancer: Of All Cancer Cells, All the Time?, 18 TRENDS
MOLECULAR MED. 509, 514 (2012) (discussing how "the complexity of in vivo human cancer ...
explains why it is so difficult to treat cancer"); Yuri Lazebnik, What Are the Hallmarks of Cancer?,
10 NATURE REVIEWS CANCER 232,232 (2010) (questioning whether "the proposed hallmarks of
cancer [are) indeed such" given "the puzzling complexity of numerous and interrelated
properties of cancers").
166. Hanahan & Weinberg, supra note 164, at 57.
167. LARRy D. KIRKPATRICK & GREGORY E. FRANCIS, PHYSICS: A WORLD VIEW 79 (6th ed.
2007).
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empirically and philosophically not universal.!68 It does much to describe
the primary attractive force between celestially sized objects, like planets, but
in some naturally complex systems, such as those with a variety of smaller
objects, the regularity of Newton's law is called into question. Indeed, the
"universal" law of gravity seemingly fails to apply on microscopic levels
because other forces, like electricity and magnetism, completely dominate
its effect.!6g
A number of scientific philosophers similarly dispute the existence of
constancy and causality in biology.!7 0 The complexity of biological diversity
is, after all, simply the product of historical accident: "Rewind the tape of
evolutionary history and play it again as many times as you will; it will never
be the same twice."!7! Discerning causal or constant factors from this
history-that is, identifying "laws" "phenomena," or even "products" in
biology-is simply impossible. On this point, John Beatty, a philosopher of
biology, declared that "there are no laws of biology. For, whatever 'laws' are,
they are supposed to be more than just contingently true."l7" At another
level, some biological processes are so complex, that one can regard each
instance of them as practically unique.!73 This sentiment illustrates the
problem of constancy and causality in natural "laws" and "phenomena" in
general: that" [i] t is quite impossible to have for unique phenomena general
laws like those that exist in classical mechanics."!74
B.

PROBABIUSM

Where constancy and causality fail, "probabilism"-the use of
probabilities or statistics as the basis for inductive reasoning-begins. l75 As

168. See CARTWRIGHT, supra note 122, at 56-57 (discussing gravity); DUPRE, supra note 162,
at 185 ("[Dleterminism claims that there are exceptionless universal laws of nature.
Notoriously, the truth of such laws cannot be empirically established.").
169. CARTWRIGHT, supra note 122, at 57-59. Some physicists have responded to this
philosophical criticism of gravity by arguing that simply because other forces drown out gravity'S
effect at the quantum level does not make it less of a "law." See, e.g., STEVEN WEINBERG, DREAMS
OF A FINAL THEORY 91-g5 (1993) (discussing gravity as a history of "anomalies" but a law
nonetheless). But this argument fails to address the classical requirement that "laws" as "laws,"
as opposed to just statistical regularities or coincidences, must be universal. See infra Part n.B
(discussing this counterargument with respect to probabilism).
170. See, e.g., John Beatty, The Evolutionary Contingency Thesis, in CONCEPTS, THEORIES, AND
RATIONALI1Y IN THE BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES 45, 46-47 (Gereon Wolters et al. eds., 1995); JJ.C.
SMART, PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENTIFIC REALISM 59-61 (1963).
171. PAUL S. ACUTTER & DENYS N. WHEATLEY, ABOUT LIFE: CONCEPTS IN MODERN BIOLOGY
128 (2007) (paraphrasing Stephen Jay Gould).
172. Beatty, supra note 170, at 46.
173. See Ernst Mayr, Cause and Effect in Biology, 134 SCIENCE 1501,1505 (1961) (discussing
the "uniqueness" of biology).
174.
175.

Id.
See DUPRE, supra note 162, at 194 (discussing probabilism as "residual deterministic

[i.e., causal and constant] thinking").
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some natural systems become more complex, the "laws" that govern them,
or the "phenomena" that explain them, must be increasingly couched in
mathematical terms.'7 6 The Nbody problem in physics perhaps serves as the
best example. The "law of gravity" provides an equation for the gravitational
force of one body, N, on another, depending on its mass and the distance
between them.'77 The law is ideal when one body is fixed in space (an
admittedly unrealistic situation) because each body will effect a gravitational
pull on the other. As the number of bodies increases, however, the law
begins to break down. Strange though it may seem, for a larger number of
Ns, i.e., the system becomes more complex, and the universal law of gravity
becomes more embedded in statistical probability than mathematical
certainty.17 S
In other instances, the probabilistic conclusions of experiments in
naturally complex systems are regarded as "laws" or "phenomena"
themselves. 179 Epidemiology-the study of "the health of a population ... as
a complex adaptive system"-must contend with a countless number, variety,
and interdependency of factors: "history, culture,... socioeconomic
structures," environment, ecosystems, and others. lso And whatever
conclusions can be drawn from such research are often bound in the
language of statistics, e.g., confidence intervals, p-values, and MantelHaenszel odds ratios. lSI Yet, such conclusions are often conceived of as
embodying the causalities of a system, i.e., as "laws" or "phenomena"
themselves, rather than mathematical observations. IS. This leap, from
mathematical observation to explanation of reality, suffers from what

176. See id. at 184 ("[O]ur most successful scientific theories describe a probabilistic rather
than a deterministic world."). See generally 2 THE PROBABILISTIC REVOLUTION: IDEAS IN THE
SCIENCES (Lorenz KrUger et al. eds., 1990) (discussing the increase in probabilism in
psychology, sociology, economics, physiology, evolutionary biology, and physics).
177. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
178. See generally PATRlCK SUPPES, PROBABILISTIC METAPHYSICS 12S-30 (1984) (discussing
the history and implications of the Nbody problem).
179. But see CARTWRlGHT, supra note 122, at IS4 (describing and rejecting this approach);
CARTWRIGHT, supra note 160, at 111-12 (same).
180. Neil Pearce & Franco Merletti, Complexity, Simplicity, and Epidemiology, 3S INT'L J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY SIS, SI6-17 (2006).
181. Sandro Galea et aI., Causal Thinking and Complex System Approaches in Epidemiology, 39
INT'L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 97, 101 (2010) ("Epidemiological methods, frequently married with
biostatistical techniques and approaches, continue to dwell, almost entirely, on the analysis of
data that are collected through epidemiological studies and the application of various statistical
techniques to document association present in the data collected.").
182. See id. at 100-()1 ("Although epidemiological methods are predicated on populationbased methods that should, in a perfect world, be used only for group-level inference,
epidemiologists are nonetheless accustomed to thinking of our methods as providing insight
into individual health and disease formation. The epidemiological concern with individual
health and disease poses a substantial challenge to methods, such as complex systems dynamic
models .... ").
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scientific philosopher Nancy Cartwright terms the "simulacrum account of
explanation":
I do not think these distributions are real. Statistical mechanics
works in a massive number of highly differentiated and highly
complex situations. In the vast majority of these it is incredible to
think that there is a true probability distribution for that situation;
and proofs that, for certain purposes, one distribution is as good as
another, do not go any way to making it plausible that there is one
at all. It is better, I think, to see these distributions as
fictions .... ,83
Thus, terms like natural "laws" or "phenomena" in complex, probabilistic
fields should have significantly less force: they are less "laws" or
"phenomena" of nature than they are "laws" or "phenomena" of a statistical,
"simulacrum account" of observations of nature.
Similarly, defining a "product" of nature is also often an exercise in
probabilism, complicated by natural complexity. What scientists refer to as a
"typical" human gene, for example, actually encompasses a wide variety of
genetic sequences within the human population.· 84 Determining the
archetypal sequence of that gene, the "consensus sequence," is therefore
very much a product of statistics, rather than the specific identification of a
gene with the consensus sequence as it actually exists in nature.'85
Characterizing a particular genetic sequence as a "natural product" is
consequently a two-step act of probabilism: using statistical methodology to
determine a consensus sequence, and then using statistical methodology to
subsequently determine whether the studied genetic sequence is similar
enough to the consensus sequence to be considered equivalent. Even this,
however, does not necessarily resolve the issue of whether a particular
genetic sequence is a natural "product" because there are "a massive
number of highly differentiated and highly complex" methods to compute
similarity.'86 Recently, researchers' efforts to determine how much of the
human genome was covered by patents claiming "an isolated DNA having at
least 15 nucleotides" of a particular sequence erupted into a fiery debate
over methodology.'8 7 This has all "led these biologists into a philosophical

183. CARTWRIGHT, supra note 122, at 154.
184. See Michele Cargill et aL, Characterization of Single-Nucleotide Polymarphisms in Coding
Regions of Human Genes, 22 NATURE GENETICS 231,232-33 (1999) (measuring the diversity of
polymorphisms in 106 human genes).
185. Thomas D. Schneider, Consensus Sequence Zen, 1 APPLIED BIOINFORMATICS Ill, Ill,
113 (2002).
186. See CARTWRIGHT, supra note 122, at 154.
187. Compare Jeffrey Rosenfeld & Christopher E. Mason, Peroasive Sequence Patents Cover the
Entire Human Genome, 5 GENOME MED. 27 (2013) (claiming that randomized, 15 nucleotide
DNA sequences cover approximately 41 % of all human genes), and Christopher Mason, Dr.
Chris Mason Responds to Blog Posts on Genome Medicine Article-Updated, PATENT Docs (Apr. 10,
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trap: confounding the model of reality (the consensus sequence) with
reality."188 Ultimately, if natural "laws," "phenomena," and "products" are
"irreducibly probabilistic .... [They] may often be limited to distinguishing
factors that influence the probability of the effect to be explained .... But
that is the most to which we can legitimately aspire."'8 9

C.

FuNDAMENTAliSM

As a general matter, natural "laws" and "phenomena" imply a sense of
"fundamentalism": that is, whether a law or a phenomena is wholly
irreducible, and therefore, "fundamental," or, rather, a construct of other
irreducible laws. '90 Under this framework, the photon theory of light-that
light is composed of smaller subunits, termed "photons"-is a "fundamental
law" or a "phenomenon" because it cannot be reduced any further. The heat
radiating properties of light, however, are not fundamental "laws" or
"phenomena" in this sense because they are reducible: they can be
explained by photon theory.19 1 Light's propensity to heat a target is actually
photons' propensity to heat a target. Under a fundamentalist interpretation,
at least, natural "laws" and "phenomena" are only those observations that
meet at "the point of convergence of all our arrows of explanation."1 9o
Natural complexity, however, upends this distinction because, often,
"[t]he behavior of large and complex aggregates of elementary particles, it
turns out, is not to be understood in terms of a simple extrapolation of the
properties of a few particles."193 Rather, "at each level of complexity entirely
new properties appear" that cannot be explained by simply reducing that

2013, 11:59 PM), http://perma.cc/7KEH-P64Y (same), with Donald Zuhn, Genome Medicine
Article Calls for Limits on Patenting of Existing Nucleotide Sequences, PATENT Docs (Apr. 2, 2013,
11:59 PM), http://perma.cc/5SSM-VGSU (criticizing the study's methodology and application
to patent law), and Donald Zuhn, Revisiting Genome Medicine Article on "Peroasive Sequence Patents"
that "Cover the Entire Human Genome, "PATENT Docs (Apr. S, 2013, 11:59 PM), http://perma.cc/
HS7W-TYPK (same), and Kevin E. Noonan, A Response to Dr. Mason's "Rebuttal" to Criticisms of His
Genomics Medicine Article, PATENT Docs (Apr. II, 2013, 11:59 PM), http://perma.cc/K2UVU7TT (same), and Donald Zuhn, A Primer on Claim Construction-Comments on Dr. Mason's
Response, PATENT Docs (Apr. 11,2013,11:55 PM), http://perma.cc/ 4MQT-EJ23 (same).
ISS. See Schneider, supra note 185, at liS.
IS9. DUPRE, supra note 162, at IS4.
190. See WEINBERG, supra note 169, at 144-49 (discussing fundamentalism and explanatory
power).
191.
See id. at 20 ("We have an overwhelming sense that the photon theory of light is more
fundamental than any statement about heat radiation and is therefore the explanation of the
properties of heat radiation. And in the same way, although Newton derived his famous laws of
motion in part from the earlier laws of Kepler that describe the motion of planets in the solar
system, we say that Newton's laws explain Kepler's, not the other way around.").
192.
[d. at 43; accord Philip W. Anderson, Physics: The opening to Complexity, 92 PROC. NAT'L
ACAD. SCI. U.S. 6653, 6653 (1995) ("[Ilgnorance about these laws persists only on the extreme
scales of the very small, the very cosmic, or the very weak and subtle.").
193. Anderson, supra note 20, at 393.
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system to its component parts. 194 Understanding the molecular structure of
water, for example, does little to explain why each snowflake forms its own
unique crystalline pattern.'95 This principle of "emergence" has long been
one of the defining features of complex systems. 196
Emergence has several consequences for using the terms "laws,"
"phenomena," or "products" to describe naturally complex systems. First,
emergence equalizes, across scientific fields, the existence of events arguably
termed "laws" or "phenomena" because almost all scientific fields have
irreducible, and therefore, fundamental properties. This counsels against a
"hierarchy of sciences" where some sciences contain such "fundamental
laws," while others are mere applications of them; emergence "does not
imply that science X is 1ust applied Y."'197 Therefore, if the laws or
phenomena that govern elementary particle physics are only "natural laws"
or "phenomena" because their behavior reduces to smaller component
parts, then emergence suggests that the "laws" governing the social sciences
are equally so because we have difficulty reducing concepts like rational
choice, dichotomous balloting, or television's effect on violence.'98
Second, emergent phenomena complicate distinguishing "natural
products" from those that are the result of human intervention in naturally
complex processes. The immune system, for example, produces antibodies,
the workhorses of the immune system, in response to foreign
macromolecules, or antigens.'99 Whether a synthetic vaccine actually confers
immunity on a particular patient therefore depends on whether the immune
system produces antibodies to the vaccine antigens. But such antibodies are
"emergent entities that are defined by their specific antibody partners and
exist only in the context of the immune system" unique to the individual in
which they are produced.· oo This complicates the question of whether any
particular antibody produced in response to human intervention-in this
example, the administration of antigens-is a natural product rather than a
byproduct of this synthetic utilization of emergent phenomena. Such
antibodies exist only due to human activity, and yet are created
, independently from human control. The same could also be said of species

194. [d,
195. Bruce C. Gibb, Reaching Out to Complexity, 1 NATURE CHEMISTRY 252, 252 (2009)
(describing snowflake formation through complexity and emergence).
196. R.B, Laughlin & David Pines, The Theory of Everything, 97 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. U,S.
28,30 (2000) (discussing emergence).
197. Anderson, supra note 20, at 393.
198. William A. Gorton, The Philosaphy of Social Science, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.,
http://perma.cc/5BC7-C6J4 (last visited Jan. 16,2014),
199. See Holland, supra note 132, at 18-19.
200. Marc H.v. Van Regenmortel, Reductionism and Complexity in Molecular Biology, 5 EMBO
REp. 1016, 1019 (2004).
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altered by climate change or exotic particles from "atom-smasher"
experiments.
Lastly, emergence suggests, in fact, that some "fundamental laws" or
"phenomena" may not be fundamental after all-not because they are
irreducible, but because they simply fail to govern emergent properties of
their aggregates. That is, even "grant[ing] that a law is true-even a law of
'basic' physics or a law about the so-called 'fundamental particles'-is far
from admitting that it is universal-that it holds everywhere and governs in
all domains.''201 Some "phase transitions" in physical chemistry-the dividing
lines between phases of matter, like liquids or solids-demonstrate this
aphorism because they are subject to emergent properties that appear to
directly oppose the "fundamental laws" governing their components. For
example, certain iron-based magnets, cooled below certain temperatures,
display magnetic direction even though the "fundamental laws" governing
magnetism concerning their individual atoms in isolation would dictate
otherwise. 202 This highlights the paradox of calling either of these properties
fundamental "laws of nature." For, "if one thinks that laws are among the
fundamental facts we hope to discover about the universe, such dependency
will seem a serious embarrassment."2og
III. THE EFFECTS OF NATURAL COMPLEXIlY ON PATENT EUGIBILIlY

Natural complexity therefore confounds classical notions of natural
"laws," "phenomena," and "products." It places significant cognitive
difficulties on determining whether "laws" or "phenomena" are either
constant or causal, as is traditionally required. It further muddies clear
definitions of natural "laws," "phenomena," or "products" by tying such
terms to probabilistic determinants. And it repudiates patent eligibility's
natural terms' adherence to principles of fundamentalism.
Because the Supreme Court's historical reliance on such terms is
tethered to a scientific understanding of them, the difficulties complexity
imparts on patent eligibility's "natural" terms account for several of the
doctrine's troubles. First, patent eligibility wrongly equates all claims
directed to natural "laws," "phenomena," and "products," even though
natural complexity shows that such terms encompass a wide variety of
concepts. Second, the difficulties in defining such terms have led the
Supreme Court to marginalize patent claim language. And third, the
vagueness of what constitutes natural "laws," "phenomena," and "products"
has had an impermissible technology-specific effect for molecular biology.

201. CARTWRIGHT, supra note 160, at 24.
202. Paul Humphreys, Emergence, Not Supervenience, 64 PHIL. SCI. 5337, 5344 (1997)
(describing the spontaneous symmetry breaking of ferromagnets below Curie temperatures as
an example of emergent phenomena).
203. DUPRE, supra note 162, at 206.

THE NATURAL COMPLEXITY OF PATENT ELIGIBIliTY
A.

FALSE EQUNALENCY

The current doctrine of patent eligibility falsely equates all "laws of
nature," "natural phenomena," and "products of nature," irrespective of
their individual content.·04 Any patent claim that encompasses one of these
identities is rendered ineligible.2°5 Thus, a court would treat a claim
encompassing wide-ranging, almost universal natural "laws," such as massenergy equivalence, identically to highly irreproducible and narrow data
from clinical trialS.2°6 Over time, the Supreme Court has given several
justifications for this equivalency: that treating all natural "laws,"
"phenomena," and "products" the same is cognitively simpler; that all such
claims monopolize knowledge about the natural world-a normatively
undesirable result; and that such patents, by way of stare decisis, are not
"Discoveries" for the Constitution's purposes. Given that natural complexity
complicates precise definitions of natural "laws," "phenomena," and
"products," this calls for a critical re-examination of the Court's
justifications.
First, the Court has expressly declined to draw distinctions among
different natural "laws" or "phenomena" because, among other reasons,
"[c]ourts and judges are not institutionally well suited to making the kinds
of judgments needed to distinguish among different laws of nature,"·07
paralleling other areas of the Court's scientifically cautious jurisprudence.2 08
According to the Court, this counsels in favor of "a bright-line prohibition
against patenting laws of nature" because it "serves as a somewhat more
easily administered proxy."·09 This is not atypical: other areas of patent law
have long favored bright-line rules as proxies for cognitive simplicity.2l0 But
in the patent eligibility context, such favor glosses over the predicate
204. Mayo Collaborative SeIVS. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303 (2012)
("[O]ur cases have not distinguished among different laws of nature according to whether or
not the principles they embody are sufficiently narrow.").
205. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) ("The Court's precedents provide three
specific exceptions to § 101 's broad patent-eligibility principles: 'laws of nature, physical
phenomena, and abstract ideas.'" (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309
(1980 »).
206. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297 (comparing Einstein's famous equation, E=mc', to the
conclusions derived from the clinical trial data at issue in the patent claims and holding the
claim invalid); see also John P .A. Ioannidis, Contradicted and Initially Stronger Effects in Highly Cited
Clinical Research, 294 JAMA 218, 218 (2005) (discussing the difficulties in reproducing and
drawing definitive conclusions from most clinical trials).
207. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1303.
208. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 148 (1997) (Breyer, j., concurring)
(" Ul udges are not scientists and do not have the scientific training that can facilitate the
making of [scientific] decisions .... [W]hen law and science intersect, those duties often must
be exercised with special care.").
209. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1303.
210.
See, e.g., Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE LJ. 2, 34-35 (2010)
(discussing the use of a bright-line rule in the context of prosecution history estoppel).
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question of whether it is cognitively simple to discern natural "laws,"
"phenomena," or "products" in the first instance-something that natural
complexity suggests is not. Indeed, the difficulties with some of the
traditional issues associated with natural "laws" and "phenomena"constancy, causality, probabilism, and fundamentalism-even independent
of natural complexity cast doubt on the Court's rationale that its refusal to
distinguish among natural "laws" and "phenomena" is due to cognitive
simplicity.211
Second, the Court has recently expressed its belief that allowing any
patents encompassing natural "laws," "phenomena," or "products" "will
inhibit future innovation premised upon them,"212 by"preempt[ing] the use
of a natural law" in research.' 13 Thus, while "the underlying functional
concern here is a relative one: how much future innovation is foreclosed
relative to the contribution of the inventor," a "narrow law of nature ... can
[still] inhibit future research."'14 But if natural "laws" or "phenomena" have
little inherent content or are not "laws" or "phenomena" in the traditional
sense (as natural complexity would suggest), research preemption should be
of significantly less concern. The natural "laws" at issue in Mayo, for
example, concerned blood concentrations of drug metabolites as derived
from clinical study data.' 15 And the Court recognized that the "naturalness"
of the gene sequences at issue in Myriad was a fiction: "[T] here is no 'typical'
gene because nucleotide sequences vary between individuals, sometimes
dramatically."'16 These putative "laws" suffer from the various complications
natural complexity imposed: they were neither constant nor causal; they
were based on probabilistic inference; and they were not "fundamental" in
any sense of the word. In fact, the clinical data incorporated into the Mayo
patents' specifications suggested that the "law" claimed in those patents

211. See Sichelman, supra note 9, at 10 ("This tension is exacerbated by current judicial and
Patent Office practice, which-in order to keep the administrative costs of gatekeeping lowtend to draw bright lines to demarcate areas of patentable subject matter from non-patentable
subject matter. These practices remove the flexibility that a more policy-<lriven approach
requires, and introduces more than a modicum of arbitrariness in many cases. Of course, these
concerns raise the specter of the old rules-standards debate-which are often difficult to answer
without concerted empirical analysis-but in a legal field with rapid change, rigid rules often
seem out of place.").
212. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301.
213.
214.

Id.atI294·
Id. at 1303; accord Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010) (rejecting a "patent

[on] risk hedging [because itl would pre-empt use of this approach in all fields, and would
effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract idea"); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978)
(quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972)); Benson, 409 U.S. at 72 (concluding
that the patent "would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in practical effect would
be a patent on the algorithm itself").
215. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1295.
216. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2112 n.1
(201 3).
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applied to less than half of patients. 2I7 This would presumably leave
researchers free to challenge the veracity of the "law" in a variety of contexts,
or make practical use of it for those situations falling outside of the
specifications' clinical data, rather than meaningfully preempting research
in any way. True concerns about preemption, therefore, counsel in favor of
making individualized determinations about the exclusionary scope of
natural "laws," "phenomena," and "products" rather than the Court's
current per se exclusionary ruleyS
And third, the Court suggests that stare decisis compels it to forbid all
claims concerning natural "laws," "phenomena," and "products" because its
"cases have not distinguished among different laws of nature according to
whether or not the principles they embody are sufficiently narrow."2lg But,
in other areas, the Court has acknowledged that stare decisis carries less
force if "facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have
robbed the old rule of significant application or justification."22o The
relatively recent scientific and philosophical recognition of natural
complexity, and its effect on terms like natural "laws," "phenomena," and
"products," seem like precisely the sort of facts, seen so differently, as to rob
older conceptions of patent eligibility's "natural" terms of their reasonable
application. When patent eligibility concerned itself with "principles" and
"abstractions," a uniform exclusionary rule may have had its justifications.
But given natural complexity's effect on these terms, the Court's own
jurisprudence on stare decisis favors abandoning its reliance on past
uniformity.
B.

MARGINAU7ATION OF CLAIM LANGUAGE

Because "all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or
apply laws of nature, [or] natural phenomena,"22' the Supreme Court has
repeatedly made clear that claims are not patent ineligible simply if they

217.
See U.s. Patent No. 6,355,623 B2 col. 17 II. 1(}-22 (filed Apr. 8, 1999) (tabulating the
claimed dosage ranges only for patients that initially responded to drug therapy and had a drug
metabolism that fell within specified ranges-45 out of 107 subjects).
218.
See Strandburg, supra note 3, at 587-91 (criticizing per se exclusion in patentable
subject matter's preemption rationale).
219.
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1303; accord Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225 ("[T]hese exceptions have
defined the reach of the statute as a matter of statutory stare decisis going back 150 years ....
[as] 'part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men ... free to all men and reserved exclusively
to none.'" (second ellipses in original) (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333
U.S. 127, 130 (1948»).
220. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992) (citing Burnet v.
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 412 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting»; accord Am.
Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 302 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
("Significantly changed circumstances can make an older rule, defensible when formulated,
inappropriate .... ").
221. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293.
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contain natural "laws" or "phenomena."222 Rather, the doctrine of patent
eligibility only excludes claims that encompass natural "laws" or
"phenomena," or "simply state the law of nature while adding the words
'apply it."'223 In drawing this distinction, a patent's claim language-the
precise verbiage used in a patent's claims-has long been thought to be "of
primary importance"22 4 because claim language does not simply describe the
invention, but "define[s] and circumscribe[s]" the invention itself. 22 5
Natural complexity, however, makes defining what a natural "law" or
"phenomena" is in the first instance increasingly difficult. As a result, the
Court has had trouble parsing claim language into separate "elements"226 to
determine whether claims read on natural "laws" or "phenomena"
themselves or whether they simply "use, reflect, rest upon, or apply" those
"laws" or "phenomena. "227
In response to its troubles parsing claim language, the Court has
marginalized, and in some cases, entirely discounted, the importance of
claim language precision. It has, instead, adopted a variety of proxies to
ascertain whether "the invention" reads on natural "laws," "phenomena," or
"products"-even though there is no concept of "the invention" apart from

222.
[d. ("[A] process is not unpatentable simply because it contains a law of nature or a
mathematical algorithm." (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
223.
[d. at 1294 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972)).
224. Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568,570 (1876); see also Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294 ("Our
conclusion rests upon an examination of the particular claims before us in light of the Court's
precedents.") .
225. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("Claims
define the subject matter that, after examination, has been found to meet the statutory
requirements for a patent. Their principal function, therefore, is to provide notice of the
boundaries of the right to exclude and to define limits; it is not to describe the invention,
although their original language contributes to the description and in certain cases satisfies it.
Claims define and circumscribe, the written description discloses and teaches." (citation
omitted)). But see Oskar Liivak, Rescuing the Invention from the Cult of the Claim, 42 SETON HALL L.
REv. 1, 7-8 (2012) (rejecting this view on historical grounds as a "cult").
226.
See Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1533 n.9 (Fed.
Cir. 1987) ("Because claims are composed ofa number of limitations, the limitations have on
occasion been referred to as 'claim elements' or 'elements of the claim' .... ").
227.
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293; see also id. at 1294 ("[A] process that focuses upon the use of
a natural law [must] also contain other elements or a combination of elements, sometimes
referred to as an 'inventive concept,' sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to
significantly more than a patent upon the natural law itself." (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S.
584,594 (1978))); Bilski v. Kappas, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230 (2010) ("Diehremphasized the need
to consider the invention as a whole, rather than 'dissect[ing] the claims into old and new
elements and then ... ignor[ing] the presence of the old elements in the analysis.'" (alterations
in original) (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188)); Flook, 437 U.S. at 590 n.12 ("[T]he Court [has]
upheld a patent on an improvement on a papermaking machine that made use of the law of
gravity to enhance the flow of the product. The patentee, of course, did not claim to have
discovered the force of gravity, but that force was an element in his novel conception.").
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the patent's claims.·· s Notably, as in Diehr, the Court resorted to reading the
claims "as a whole."··g Where the claims, "as a whole," were directed to "a
function which the patent laws were designed to protect," the application is
eligible.· 30 Where, "as a whole," they are not, "a competent draftsman
[could] evade the recognized limitations on the type of subject matter
eligible for patent protection."·3 1
Similarly, in Mayo, the Court repeatedly referred to the "inventive
concept" of the patent independent of the patent's precise claim
language.· 3 ' This allowed the Court to elide over the precise claim language
at issue by turning patent eligibility into a quantitative rather than qualitative
inquiry: "[D]o the patent claims add enough to their statements of the
correlations to allow the processes they describe to qualify as patent-eligible
processes that apply natural laws?"'33 In the Court's words, patent claims
making use of "laws of nature" are not patent eligible "unless that process
has additional features that provide practical assurance that the process is

228. SeeAro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 344-45 (1961)
("[It is a] basic fallacy ... [to] require [ ] the ascribing to one element of the patented

combination the status of patented invention in itself. ... [T]his Court has made it clear ...
that there is no legally recognizable or protected 'essential' element, 'gist' or 'heart' of the
invention .... "); Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F·3d 1369, 1372
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (Moore, j., dissenting) ("The error in Retractable is the majority's attempt to
rewrite the claims to better conform to what it discerns is the 'invention' of the patent instead
of construing the language of the claim."); Computer Docking Station Corp. v. Dell, Inc., 519
F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("The words of the claims define the scope of the patented
invention." (emphasis added) (citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582
(Fed. Cir. 1996»); Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("We find
the district court's concern with 'what the invention is' misplaced .... 'The invention' is
defined by the claims on appeal.").
229. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187 ("[I]f the computer use incorporated in the process patent
significantly lessens the possibility of 'overcuring' or 'undercuring,' the process as a whole does
not thereby become unpatentable subject matter." (emphasis added»; id. at 188 ("In
determining the eligibility of respondents' claimed process for patent protection under § 101,
their claims must be considered as a whole." (emphasis added»; id. at 192 ("On the other hand,
when a claim containing a mathematical formula implements or applies that formula in a
structure or process which, when considered as a whole, is performing a function which the
patent laws were designed to protect ... then the claim satisfies the requirements of § 10 1.»
(emphasis added»; id. at 193 n.15 ("The fact that one or more of the steps in respondents'
process may not, in isolation, be novel or independently eligible for patent protection is
irrelevant to the question of whether the claims as a whole recite subject matter eligible for patent
protection under § 101." (first emphasis added».
230. Id.atI92.
231. Id.
232. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294 ("[A] process that focuses upon the use of a natural law
[must] also contain other elements or a combination of elements, sometimes referred to as an
'inventive concept,' sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more
than a patent upon the natural law itself." (emphasis added) (quoting Flook, 437 U.S. at 594»;
id. at 1299 (" [P]utting the formula to the side [in Flook] there was no 'inventive concept' in the
claimed application of the formula." (emphasis added) (quoting Flook, 437 U.S. at 594».
233. Id. at 1297.
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more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the law of nature
itself."'34
In other instances, the Court has simply belittled the significance of
claim language. In Flook, for example, the Court criticized the use of claim
language in the eligibility determinations as "the draftsman's art [that]
would ill serve the principles underlying the prohibition against patents for
'ideas' or phenomena of nature."'35 "A competent draftsman could attach
some form of post-solution activity to almost any mathematical formula," the
Court declared.'3 6 The Court has since repeated this "draftsman" epithet in
almost every one of its patent eligibility cases. '37
The Court's decision in Myriad may initially appear as an exception to
its diminishment of claim language,238 In invalidating Myriad's composition
claims directed to molecules of DNA, the Court noted that "Myriad's claims
are simply not expressed in terms of chemical composition, nor do they rely
in any way on the chemical changes that result from the isolation of a
particular section of DNA. Instead, the claims understandably focus on the
genetic information encoded in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes. "'39 But this
brief allusion to claim language factored little in the Court's decision
separating isolated genomic DNA from cDNA. Indeed, the actual claim
language for both classes of DNA was remarkably similar: both expressed
themselves as limited to an "isolated DNA."24 The Court's effort in Myriad
does less to parse claim language as the determinant of patent eligibility
than it uses claim language as a cover to decide what is and is not "natural."
Ultimately, this denigration of claim language has made claim drafting
increasingly problematic,24 1 Without guidance as to what constitutes a
natural "law," "phenomena," or "product," patent practitioners have few
0

234.
235·
236.
237.

[d.
Flook, 437 U.S. at 593.
[d. at 590.
E.g., Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294 ("[C]ases warn us against interpreting patent statutes in

ways that make patent eligibility 'depend simply on the draftsman's art' without reference to
the 'principles underlying the prohibition against patents for [natural laws].'" (alteration in
original) (quoting Flook, 437 U.S. at 593»; Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs.,
Inc., 548 U.S. 124,137 (2006) (Breyer,]., dissenting) ("[Diehr] warn[s] against 'allow[ing] a
competent draftsman to evade the recognized limitations on the type of subject matter eligible
for patent protection.'" (third alteration in original) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175,
192 (1981 »).
238. See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2118
(201 3).
239. [d.
240. See id. at 2113.
241. . See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Re-Examining the Role of Patents in Appropriating the Value of
DNA Sequences, 49 EMORY LJ. 783, 785 (2000) ("The standard patent lawyer's response to the
'products of nature' limitation is to treat it as a technical, claim-drafting problem.").
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ways to assess whether a claim element constitutes one. 242 And even with
such guidance, patent practitioners are left with "no definitive answer on
what additional elements/steps would be sufficient to ensure that a natural
phenomena would have a practical application that would be patentable."2 43
Patent practitioners must therefore cope with a field where "esoteric terms
of art are simply indispensable" but where "the inherent complexity of
technology, the limitations of language, and the doctrinal standard for
evaluating patents" provide little concrete measure as to how to assess such
terms for eligibility.244 Now, "[t]he diversity and dizzying complexity of
contemporary innovation, the broader reach of patentable subject matter,
and the brisker pace of technological advancement render prescient claim
drafting an ideal far more difficult to achieve today."2 45

C.

TECHNOLOGy-SPECIFIC EJiJ.ECTS

Patent law has long prided itself on being "technology-neutral"; it
generally does not set different rules for inventions in different areas of
technology.2 46 Relatively few legal doctrines turn on the class of technology
sought to be patented, and even fewer statutory provisions distinguish
among technologies. 247 The Federal Circuit has noted that this "accords the
same treatment to all forms of invention."248 This principle of technological
neutrality is further embodied in the watershed international agreement on
patents, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights ("TRIPS").249 Article 27(1) of TRIPS requires signatories to confirm
that "patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or
242. See 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.03[2] [fl [ix] (2013) ("The three
determinations for implementing [Mayo] are as follows. First, one determines whether a claim
is drawn to a law of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract idea.... The first weak point is the
Court's failure to define what constitutes a 'law of nature.' The absence of a definition is
reflected in the Court's rather summary determination that the claims at issue did involve such
a 'law of nature.''').
243. 2 JOHN GLADSTONE MIllS III ET AL., PATENT LAw FUNDAMENTALS § 7+50 (2d ed.
201 3).
244. Lee, supra note 210, at 19-20.
245. John R. Thomas, Claim Re-Construction: The Doctrine of Equivalents in the Post-Markman
Era, 9 LEWIS & CLARKL. REv. 153, 166 (2005).
246. But see Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley. Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REv. 1575,
1675-95 (2003) (arguing that, normatively, courts should use "policy levers" to adopt
technological specificity in some fields of an).
247. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. LJ. 1155, 1156 (2002) ("Patent law has a general set oflegal rules to govern the validity
and infringement of patents in a wide variety of technologies. With very few exceptions, the
statute does not distinguish between different technologies in setting and applying legal
standards.") .
248. Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
249. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex lC, 1869 U.N.T.S.
299; see also Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. NO.1 03-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994).
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processes, in all fields of technology."'5 Ideally, the normative purpose of
the rule is fOIWard-looking: it ensures that patent eligibility can "adapt
flexibly to new technologies," without waiting for the laborious legislative
process to unwind itself each time a pioneering technology seeks patent
protection.' 51 In this sense, U.S. patent law is "a unified patent system that
provides technology-neutral protection to all kinds of technologies."25'
Technologically-neutral language, however, can have technologically
specific application.' 53 Although the difficulties natural complexity imparts
on patent eligibility's "natural" terms would appear to apply across multiple
fields, the Court has, in practice, only applied them in the biotechnology
context. Indeed, every Supreme Court decision to substantively address
arguments that a patent claimed a "law of nature" or a "natural phenomena"
(as opposed to an "abstract idea") has concerned patents in the
biotechnology space. Funk Brothers concerned the patenting of bacterial
inoculants;'54 Chakrabarty, recombinant bacteria;'55 Mayo, medical diagnostic
tests;'5 6 and Myriad, human genes.' 57 Even Laboratory Corp.-a dissent from a
dismissal of an improperly granted writ-concerned biotechnology.'58 This
biotechnology-specific effect has also been generally true of the Federal
Circuit and its predecessor court, the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals.'59 Exceptions have been rare.· 50
0

250. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 249,
art. 27(1), at 331.
251. Burk & Lemley, supra note 247, at 1156; id. at 1158 ("Congress cannot enact a new
form of intellectual property statute each time a new technology arises.").
252. [d. at 1156.
253. See generally id. (documenting how courts apply the non obviousness standard
differently between biotechnology and software patents).
254. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 129 (1948).
255· Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980).
256. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1291 (2012).
257. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013).
258. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 125 (2006)
(Breyer,]. dissenting) (concerning medical diagnostic tests).
259. E.g., Perkin Elmer, Inc. v. Intema Ltd., 496 Fed. App'x 65, 66 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(screening for Down's syndrome); Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F'3d
1057, 1059 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (immunization schedule for chronic immune-mediated disorders);
Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc. v. ].E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., 200 F.3d 1374, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(seeds for hybrid com), affd, 534 U.S. 124 (2001); Application of Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 969
(C.C.P.A. 1979) (bacteria), vacated in part sub nom. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028
(1980); Application of Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 939 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (hormones); see also Animal
Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 922-23 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (addressing whether
PTO's "interpretative rule" that "non naturally occurring non-human multicellular living
organisms, including animals, to be patentable subject matter" under § 10 I, fell under the
Administrative Procedure Act).
260. There appears to have been only three cases where the Federal Circuit or its
predecessor court has described a property of a patented invention as a "law of nature" or
"natural phenomena" outside of the biotechnology context. EMI Grp. N. Am., Inc. v. Cypress
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Meanwhile, patents in other technologies have avoided being labeled as
"laws of nature," "natural phenomena," or "products of nature." Questions
concerning the patent eligibility of mathematical algorithms--even those
describing aspects of the natural world-have been shunted to "abstract
ideas." Diehr, for example, turned on whether the industrial application of
the Arrhenius equation-the influence of temperature on the rate of
chemical reactions-was too abstract to be patented, rather than whether it
encompassed, and wholly preempted, a "law of nature" or a "natural
phenomenon."261 Similarly, chemical-process patents have largely evaded
scrutiny under patent eligibility's "natural" terms since the Supreme Court's
1966 decision in Brenner v. Manson, allowing such patents to go forward as
long as the patentee could identify the chemical compound's specific
utility.262 This despite the fact that chemical process patents are largely
directed to sequential series of chemical reactions-reactions that, like the
technology in Mayo, simply take advantage of telling a reader to make use of
natural regularities in step-wise fashion. 26 3 Even nanotechnology, a field that
largely takes advantage of rare but often naturally occurring materials'
inherent properties, has thus far escaped scrutiny as potentially ineligible
subject matter.· 64
This difference in how patent eligibility is applied to biotechnology is
not because these technologies do not raise the same concerns as those in
the biological context. The dangers in patenting the Arrhenius equation, for
example-that the patent's claims will likely be too broad relative to their
disclosure,·65 that doing so would inhibit further research in the equation's
area of science,.66 and that it would monopolize a "part of the storehouse of

Semiconductor Corp., 268 F.3d 1342, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (describing a "vapor-induced fuse
explosion mechanism" as an inherent "law of nature"); In re Bonczyk, 10 F. App'x 908, 911
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (calling "energy" a "natural phenomenon"); In re Arnold, 185 F.2d 686, 691
(C.C.P.A. 1950) (characterizing the ideal frequency used in electrostatic fusion as a
"phenomenon of nature").
261.
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981); see Laidler, supra note 125, at 494
(describing the Arrhenius equation).
262. Brennerv. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-36 (1966).
263. Cf Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1298 (2012)
("For these reasons we believe that the steps are not sufficient to transform unpatentable
natural correlations into patentable applications of those regularities.").
264. See Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REv. 601, 613-14 (2005)
(describing nanotechnology patents and stating that there is "no question about patentable
subject matter"); see also U.S. Patent No. 6,689,674 B2 (filed May 7,2002) (claiming a method
for fabricating nanotubes by using a nanoparticle catalyst to assemble itself on a matrix).
265. Cf Lemley et aI., supra note 3, at 1317 (equating patent law's prohibition on "abstract
ideas" to a concern with preventing overbroad claims).
266. Cf Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294 ("At the same time, upholding the patents would risk
disproportionately tying up the use of the underlying natural laws, inhibiting their use in the
making offurther discoveries.").
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knowledge of all men,"26 7- parallel those raised in Funk Brothers, Mayo, and
Myriad. Nor does this biotechnology-specific effect mean that non biological
inventions are any less "natural" in principle. It is also surely not because
nonbiological inventions are somehow less affected by natural complexity
than their biological counterparts. 26B Rather, it simply seems that courts have
had more difficulty struggling with patent eligibility's "vague and malleable
terms infected with too much ambiguity and equivocation" 26 9 in some
scientific contexts rather than others.
IV. SIMPLIFYING PATENT EUGIBIUlY

A. PATENT ELICIBILI1Y'S COMPLEXI1Y
Despite the problems natural complexity poses for using patent
eligibility'S "natural" terms, the Supreme Court seems to be obstinate in
using them. And recent opportunities for the Court to provide a legalistic
framework to patent eligibility, such as Bilski, Mayo, and Myriad, have done
little more than promote the doctrine's "subjective and empty words."27°
Scholars' proposals to provide workarounds to using the terms have gained,
unfortunately, little traction. 27 And Congress, even in its most recent
overhaul of the patent statute-the most significant in sixty years-has
abdicated responsibility.2 7 2 Any realistic solution to the riddle of patent
eligibility'S "natural" terms must take these limits into account. Calls to
reform patent eligibility by eliminating or circumventing the doctrine or
calls asking for Congress or the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") to
step in have failed before; there is good reason to believe they will fail
1

267. Cf Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218. 3225 (2010) (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v.
Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948» (internal quotation marks omitted).
268. But see Burk & Lemley, supra note 246, at 1676 ("Biotechnology products arise out of
living systems and are typically intended to interact with other human or nonhuman living
systems. Such interactions, whether physiological or ecological, are enonnously complex and
the systems involved are poorly characterized.").
26g. Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 135 (Frankfurter,]., concurring).
270. CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 717 F'3d 126g, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Rader, CJ.,
additional reflections) ("I enjoy good writing and a good mystery, but I doubt that innovation is
promoted when subjective and empty words like 'contribution' or 'inventiveness' are offered up
by the courts to detennine investment, resource allocation, and business decisions."), eert.
granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 3131 (Dec. 6, 2013) (No. 13-2g8).
271. See, e.g., Chiang, supra note 3 (not cited by any cases); Crouch & Merges, supra note 3
(cited by CLS Bank, although not followed); Eisenberg, supra note 3 (cited by Mayo, although
not followed); Golden, supra note 3 (not cited by any cases); Kane, supra note 3 (not cited by
any cases); Risch, supra note 3 (explicitly rejected by Mayo); Strandburg, supra note 3 (not cited
by any cases). But see Lemley et aI., supra note 3 (cited by Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301-02, for the
proposition that the doctrine of patent eligibility concerns whether the invention "forecloses
more future invention than the underlying discovery could reasonably justifY").
272. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-2g, 125 Stat. 284 (2011)
(failing to amend § 10 I ).
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again. 273 But, as this Article seeks to demonstrate, any attempt to provide
more concrete definitions to patent eligibility's "natural" terms is also bound
to fail. "Natural laws," "phenomena," and "products" are, at this point, too
bound up in confusing and contradictory Supreme Court precedent, and
too infected with the vagaries of natural complexity, to be clearly resolved.
In this way, and like the science it attempts to assess, the doctrine of
patent eligibility has itself "complexified." Relative to its predecessor 150
years ago, patent eligibility must now concern itself with more elements:
more technologies, more patents, more claims, and more precedent. 274
These elements have also increased in variety: more diverse technologies,
more types of patents, more classes of claims, and more administrative
procedures to challenge them. 275 And the number of interrelationships
between these elements has similarly increased. 276
This recognition that patent eligibility is, itself, complex provides an
important foundation for reform. Indeed, this suggests that patent eligibility
would tend to benefit from other successful approaches "involve[d in] the
consideration of a most complexly organized whole."277 Like traditional legal
analyses, scientific approaches to natural complexity have long relied upon
methods of "collection, description, classification, and the observation of
concurrent and apparently correlated effects."278 And, like the law, science
has called upon several familiar legal tropes to accomplish its tasks:
"weighing evidence; ... deciding what is relevant and what is not; ... [and]
finding, interpreting, and facing facts."279 Borrowing science's strategies to
accomplish its goals may therefore be useful strategies for patent eligibility'.

273. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980) ("The choice [on
patentable subject matter] we are urged to make is a matter of high policy for resolution within
the legislative process after the kind of investigation, examination, and study that legislative
bodies can provide and courts cannot. ... Whatever their validity, the contentions now pressed
on us should be addressed to the political branches of the Government, the Congress and the
Executive, and not to the courts."); Crouch & Merges. supra ~ote 3. at 1683-91 (asking courts
to address patent eligibility last in an effort to avoid difficult eligibility determinations); Golden.
supra note 3, at 1041 ("[T]he enterprise of regulating patentable subject matter should be
primarily entrusted to the USPTO, rather than, as it is now, to the courts."); Risch, supra note 3.
at 598-609 (advocating for the elimination of patent eligibility by using other areas of the
patent statute).
To be clear: this is not to say that these proposals were not good, or that they would not
have worked had they been implemented. This is only to say that these proposals have little
chance of actually being adopted.
274. See Josh Lerner, 150 Years of Patent Office Practice, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 112 (2005);
Josh Lerner, 150 Years of Patent Protection, 92 AM. ECON. REv. 221 (2002).
275. See sources cited supra note 274.
276. See Allison & Lemley. supra note 24. at 104-25 (describing. empirically. the
interrelationships among these characteristics).
277. Weaver, supra note 17, at 536.
278. [d. at 536--37.
279. [d. at 542.

IOWA LAW REVIEW
B.

[Vol. 99:1137

DECOMPOSITION AND LOCAlJ7A TION AS STRA TEGIES FOR NA TURAL COMPLEXITY

In the sciences, the problem of describing complex interactions is often
solved through the twin processes of "decomposition and localization."280
Decomposition concerns breaking down a complex system into subparts"the subdivision of the explanatory task so that the task becomes
manageable and the system intelligible."281 In physics, for example, this may
concern decomposing a particular phenomenon into subatomic particles. 282
Neurobiologists often decompose the brain into separate neural
structures. 283 And, in molecular biology, decomposition concerns breaking
down physiology into cells, proteins, or genes. 284 Decomposition is the
strategy of "divide and conquer."
Localization concerns identifying the function or functions of each
subpart; "the identification of the different activities proposed in a task
decomposition with the behavior or capacities of specific components."285
That is, it attempts to "localize" one or more properties of the complex
system to the behavior of one or more subparts. In neurobiology, for
example, a portion of the left frontal cortex is responsible for producing
speech, although not responsible for comprehending it.286 Localization is,
essentially, mapping a function of a system to one of its components.
Together, decomposition and localization allow one to develop a
"mechanistic" explanation of a complex system. 287
Harnessing decomposition and localization as strategies in simplifying
complex problems first requires an understanding of where to begin. To
that end, "[b]efore it is possible, or even relevant, to develop a fully
mechanistic explanation of how a system performs some function ... it is
necessary to identify what functions are performed and what system performs
these functions."288 This can be termed "isolating the locus of control."28g In

280. See generally BECHTEL & RICHARDSON, supra note 25 (describing decomposition and
localization in scientific practice).
281. Id. at 23.
282. William Bechtel, Reducing Psychology While Maintaining Its Autonomy via Mechanistic
Explanations, in THE MATTER OF THE MIND: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON PSYCHOLOGY,
NEUROSCIENCE, AND REDUCTION 172, 178 (Maurice Schouten & Huib Looren de Jong eds.,
2007) (describing decomposition in physics).
283. Tadeusz Zawidzki & William Bechtel, Gall's Legacy Revisited: Decomposition and
Localization in Cognitive Neuroscience, in THE MIND AS A SCIENTIFIC OBJECT: BETWEEN BRAIN AND
CULTURE 293, 293 (Christina E. Erneling & David Martel Johnson eds., 2005).
284. Fred C. Boogerd et aI., Mechanistic Explanations and Models in Molecular Systems Biology,
18 FOUND. SCI. 725 (2013).
285. BECIITEL & RICHARDSON, supra note 25, at 24.
286. See Zawidzki & Bechtel, supra note 283, at 298-99 (discussing localization in the
context of Broca's and Wernicke's areas).
287.
BECHTEL & RICHARDSON, supra note 25, at 17-23.
288. Id. at 35.
289. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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some instances, "[f1inding the right system is often difficult."29 But in
others, "nature seems to divide naturally into systems."2 91 As such, identifying
the locus of control of any particular system is, often, a dynamic product of
trial and error.29 2
0

The question, "How does a car move?" serves as a good example of
decomposition and localization in practice. As an initial matter, one should
recognize that the question is deceptively complex. The internal combustion
engine is not famous for being simple.2 93 Aside from the complexity of the
engine, moving from point A to point B is contingent on many variable,
interdependent parts: the wheels, the engine, the drivetrain, the gasoline,
and, of course, the driver. All must be present and all must act in concert for
the car to move at all. Nonetheless, in asking how the car physically moves,
we can begin by isolating the locus of control by separating the system into
car and driver. Here, the system that is moving is the car itself, rather than
the driver, alone. (The driver is surely responsible for starting and operating
the car, but it is the car that moves the driver, not the other way around.)
Once this is identified, we can decompose the car into various
components-the engine, the drivetrain, and the wheels, for instance. We
can then localize each component to a particular function of the system: the
engine is powered by gasoline and powers the drivetrain, the drivetrain
powers the wheels, and so on. And from there, we can generalize these
functions to a mechanistic description of the car's movement: it converts the
chemical energy of the gasoline into mechanical energy that moves the
wheels. 294
To be sure, decomposition and localization as strategies for simplifying
complex phenomena has its limits. The appearance of emergent properties
of complex systems-the behavior of which does not appear to be controlled
by any particular mechanism of the individual, underlying componentsmakes decomposition and localization particularly difficult.295 For truly
emergent phenomena, where "the parts do not seem to be performing
intelligible subtasks contributing to the overall task ... decomposition and
localization ... fall short."296 Similarly, where the functions of a system solely

290. [d. at 39.
291. [d.
292. See id. at 40 ("In most domains of inquiry, such recognition evolves with time and
research as scientists develop conceptual frameworks to determine a particular way of
decomposing nature into systems. ").
293. See 2 CHARLES FAYETIE TAYLOR, THE INTERNAL-COMBUSTION ENGINE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE: COMBUSTION, fuELS, MATERIALS, DESIGN 423 (rev. ed. 1985) ("The subject of detail
design of a machine so complex as an engine would require much more space than is available
here and could easily fill several volumes if covered in a thorough manner.").
294. See BECHTEL & RICHARDSON, supra note 25, at 39 (giving a car as an example of
decomposition and localization).
295. Id. at 202-03·
296. Id. at 203.
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depend on the connections between elements, rather than any individual
properties of its separate components, we should be counseled to
"abandon [J decomposition and localization."297 Nonetheless, decomposition
and localization have historically solved a broad variety of complex scientific
problems, including those in cellular respiration,29 8 fermentation,299 and
biochemical genetics. 30o Even if decomposition and localization fail in
simplifying mechanistic explanations to complex phenomena, "they may
serve as probative tools for facilitating discovery."3 01

C. A MECHANISTIC DESCRIPTION OF PATENT EUGIBIliTY
Decomposition and localization appear to be especially apt strategies
for solving the patent eligibility puzzle. Rather than rely on "a largely
meaningless 'litany' recited before 'the Court... chooses up sides and
decides the case,'"3 02 decomposition and localization provide an avenue to
mechanistically describe which particular factors actually control the Court's
patent eligibility jurisprudence. 303 This description should remand patent
eligibility inquiries from high levels of abstraction-What is a "law of
nature"?-to more concrete, narrower questions. These narrower questions,
built into a "multi prong" or "multifactor" analysis, can provide a legalistic,
descriptive test that harmonizes and explains the Court's past precedent
while moving away from the vagaries of natural "laws," "phenomena," and
"products." This analytical approach to patent eligibility should be
cognitively easier than the current state of affairs.3 04
This strategy of replacing standards' reliance on "subjective and empty
words"3 0 5 with narrower questions of application has proved successful
elsewhere in the law. For example, the Constitution's requirement that
federal courts hear only "cases or controversies"-the meanings of which
have been debated since Ratification-is now assessed through a robust
Id. at 222-23.
Id. at 72-88.
299· Id. at 153-68.
3 00 . Id. at 173-92.
3 0 1. Id. at 243.
302. Cf Fletcher, supra note 26, at 221 (alteration in original) (discussing a similar
problem regarding standing); see also id. at 290 ("The solution ... is ... to break down what
might appear to be a single, general question into discrete and particular questions.").
303. Cf BECHTEL & RICHARDSON, supra note 25, at 17-23 (identifying the goal of
decomposition and localization as providing mechanistic explanations of complex systems).
304. See id. at 23 (describing decomposition as "the subdivision of the explanatory task so
that the task becomes manageable and the system intelligible"); Fletcher, supra note 26, at 290
("As Justice Iredell wrote in 1793 in his great dissent in Chisholm v. Gemgia: 'I have often found
a great deal of confusion to arise from taking too large a view at once ... .' The solution for
Iredell was (as it is here) to break down what might appear to be a single, general question into
discrete and particular questions." (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted».
305. Cf CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 717 F.3d 1269, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Rader,].,
additional reflections) (criticizing patent eligibility's continued reliance on such terms).
297·
298.
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analytical framework.3 06 Similarly, the Constitution's prohibition on "cruel
and unusual" punishments incorporates familiar and well-worn common law
standards.307 And personal jurisdiction's call for "fair play and substantial
justice"-truly subjective and empty terms, if there ever were ones-has
since been parceled into several objective factors.3 08 Indeed, this approach
of pruning increasingly gnarly jurisprudence into cleaner branches "is as
time-honored in law as the striving for generality."309 Patent eligibilitywhich continues to reference lists of philosophically pregnant conceits, such
as whether gravity is, in fact, a "natural law"-is ripe for a similar
trimming. 310
Ideally, any such breakdown would avoid the hopelessly undefinable
terms "laws of nature," "natural phenomena," and "products of nature," and
replace them with a standard that is both objective and clear. Constructed
properly, such an analysis could also overcome the difficulties complexity
generally imparts on the doctrine of patent eligibility by allowing for nuance
among marginal eligibility cases, respecting claim language, and eliminating
technological bias. 311 Breaking down patent eligibility into cognitively
simple-and concrete-subparts is also both politically and judicially viable:
it requires neither the intervention of Congress nor a radical shift in
jurisprudence, something for which the Supreme Court has expressed its
distaste.3 12 And litigants are more likely to achieve better results from courts:
it is more like what courts typically doY3 Faced with indefinite, complex
terms, decomposition and localization appear to be coherent, feasible
strategies to resolving patent eligibility's "natural" terms.

306. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC) , Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 18081 (2000) (providing an analytical framework for assessing the existence of a "case or
controversy" under the Constitution).
307. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 839-40 (1994) (incorporating the criminal law
concept of "deliberate indifference" into defining "cruel and unusual" punishment).
308. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (analyzing "fair
play and substantial justice" as including "the burden on the defendant, the interests of the
forum State, and the plaintifTs interest in obtaining relief").
309. Fletcher, supra note 26, at 290.
310. See CARTWRIGHT, supra note 122, at 56-59 (discussing gravity); DUPRE, supra note 162,
at 185-87 (same).
31 1. See supra Part III.
312. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303 (2012)
(refusing to jettison § 101 in favor of other statutory requirements because "[tlhe approach is
... not consistent with prior law. The relevant cases rest their holdings upon section 101, not
later sections").
313. See id. (describing how courts and judges are poorly suited to address questions of
scientific philosophy); Fletcher, supra note 26, at 290 (discussing how courts do well at breaking
down general issues oflegaI theory into discrete questions).
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Identifying the Locus of Control and Decomposing Patents

The first step in decomposition and localization is identifying the "locus
of control"-the aspect of the system that "carries out a transformation of
inputs into outputs."3 14 While identitying a system's locus of control "is often
difficult,"3 15 this is not the case for patent eligibility: the locus of control for
patent eligibility is the patent document. It is the patent document itselfrather than extrinsic evidence, such as scientific norms, enforcement
policies, or market effects-that ultimately controls whether a patent
application falls within the bounds of patentable subject matter. 316
A patent can typically be decomposed into only two components: its
claims and its specification. Under 35 U.S.c. § 112(a), the patent must
"contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and
process of making and using it"-its specificationY7 The specification must
also "conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor ... regards as the
invention."3 18 A patent may also contain other elements-drawings,3 19
appendices,3 2o and even models of the invention3 21 -but these are not always
necessary, and they are often of minor importance when interpreting the
patent document.3 22

314. BECHTEL & RICHARDSON, supra note 25, at 35.
315. Id. at 39.
316. This may appear to be a tautology-what controls patent eligibility depends, after all,
on how we define it-but courts and commentators do appear to take it as a descriptive truth in
principle, if not practice. See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F·3d 1303, 1324
(Fed. Cir. 2012) ("[Ilt is important to state what this appeal is not about. It is not about
whether individuals ... are entitled to a second opinion. Nor is it about whether the [patenteel
... has acted improperly in its licensing or enforcement policies with respect to the patents.
The question is also not whether is it desirable for one company to hold a patent or license
covering a test that may save people's lives, or for other companies to be excluded from the
market encompassed by such a patent-that is the basic right provided by a patent, i.e., to
exclude others from practicing the patented subject matter."), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom.
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Jeanne C.
Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REv. 539, 554 (2009) ("[Tlhe patent document is typically
the primary situs of information about patented inventions."). At the same time, MarkJanis and
Timothy Holbrook have written about the practical difficulties in such clean distinctions
between patent law's definitions and their objects. Mark D. Janis & Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent
Law's Audience, 97 MINN. L. REv. 72, 111-16 (2012). Nonetheless, Janis and Holbrook are
"unsure whether conjuring up a different heuristic is likely to advance the law here." Id. at I l l .
317. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
318. Id. § 112(b).
319. Id. § 113 (2006).
320.
See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 8,349,334 B2 col. 93-388 (filed June 30, 20 II).
321. 35 U.S.C. § 114·
322.
See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314-17 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(discussing the central importance of the claims and the specification in interpreting a patent).
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The claims and the specification serve several functions. The claims
"alert[ ] the public of the metes and bounds of an inventor's discovery"3 2 3 or
"the outer boundaries of the patent."3 2 4 In this way, the claims "define the
scope of protection afforded by the patent" that, like land grants, provide
"descriptions of lands by metes and bounds in a deed which define the area
conveyed but do not describe the land."3 2 5 And, like any land grant, claims fence
their domain from their neighbors': they "differentiate [the invention] over
the prior art."3 26 The patent specification, on the other hand, "serves a
teaching function, as a 'quid pro quo' in which the public is given 'meaningful
disclosure in exchange for being excluded from practicing the invention for
a limited period of time. "'3 2 7 The specification describes the land of the
invention-it provides a general description of the invention as a whole,
explains its contribution to the art, and lists examples of how to use the
inventiony8 And, until recently, a patent could be invalidated for failing to
include, in the specification, the best mode of making or using the
inventionyg In short: "Specifications teach. Claims claim."33
0

2.

Localizing Patents' Components to Patent Eligibility's Goals

The second step in decomposition and localization is to map, or
"localize," the system's components to particular outputs of the systemhere, the ultimate patent eligibility determination.33 That is, how does each
function of the claims and specification map to answer whether a particular
claim is patent eligible? Viewing each of those functions through the lens of
the Supreme Court's patent eligibility jurisprudence provides some insight
1

323. In re Rosuvastatin Calcium Patent Litig., 703 F.3d 511, 536 (Fed. Cir. 2012). But see
Janis & Holbrook, supra note 316, at 112-16 (discussing the contradictory jurisprudence in this
area).
324. Mark A. Lemley, Point oJNovelty, 105 Nw. U. L. REv. 1253, 1272 (2011).
325. In re Vamco Mach. & Tool, Inc., 752 F.2d 1564, 1577 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
326. John Burke, The Prior An by Admission Doctrine:judiciaUy Created Private Prior An, 13 FED.
CIR. BJ. 607, 624 (2004).
327. Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 922 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting
Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2002»; see Fromer, supra
note 316, at 594-99 (calling for a reinvigorated disclosure requirement); Sean B. Seymore, The
Teaching Function oJPatents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 621,669 (2010) (calling for simpler patent
disclosure to better fulfill the teaching function). But see Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in
Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REv. 123, 131-46 (2006) (arguing that structural limitations in patent
law minimize the teaching function).
328. See Donald S. Chisum, Weeds and Seeds in the Supreme Coun's Business Method Patents
Decision: New Directions Jor Regulating Patent Scape, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 11, 18 (2011).
329. See generally Lee Petherbridge & Jason Rantanen, The Pseudo-Elimination oj Best Mode:
Worst Possible Choice?, 59 UCLA L. REv. DISCOURSE 170 (2012) (discussing the legal status of the
best mode requirement).
330. SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 n.14 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
331. CJ BECHTEL & RICHARDSON, supra note 25, at 35·
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into a mechanistic description of patent eligibility apart from traditional
assessments of its "natural" terms.

a.

Claim Scope

The central function of patent claims is "to define the scope of protection
afforded by the patent."33' To that end, a significant portion of the Supreme
Court's patent eligibility jurisprudence has focused on claims that appeared
to be so broad as to potentially cover yet undeveloped technologies, In
Benson, for example, the Court characterized the applicants' claims as
virtually unlimited in scope, "not limited to any particular art or technology,
to any particular apparatus or machinery, or to any particular end use."333
Rather, the claims "purported to cover any use of the claimed method in a
general-purpose digital computer of any type,"334 This made the claims "so
abstract and sweeping as to cover both known and unknown uses of the BCD
to pure binary conversion."335 In Flook, the Court noted that the applicant's
claims "cover[ed] any use of [the applicant's] formula for updating the
value of an alarm limit" in its field, which, although not expressly disclosed
in the patent application, nonetheless "cover[ ed] a broad range of potential
uses of the method."33 6 Allowing such claims to proceed, in the Court's view,
would make "the beachhead of [the patent] privilege, .. wider, and the area
of public use narrower" than Congress had presumably directed.337 And in
Bilski, the Court referred to the petitioners' claims as merely "broad
examples of how hedging can be used in commodities and energy
markets,"338 and noted that "[i]f a high enough bar is not set when
considering patent applications of this sort, patent examiners and courts
could be flooded with claims that would put a chill on creative endeavor and
dynamic change."339
Scholars have written extensively about this concern over claim breadth
in the Court's assessment of "abstract ideas." In one seminal article, Life After
Bilski, Mark A. Lemley, Michael Risch, Ted Sichelman, and R. Polk Wagner
argued that "the rule against patenting abstract ideas is best understood as
an effort to prevent inventors from claiming their ideas too broadly."34 0 In
another article, Dan L. Burk and Mark A. Lemley similarly noted that "[t]he
rule against patenting abstract ideas, while couched in terms of patentable

332. In reVamco Mach, & Tool, Inc., 752 F.2d 1564, 1577 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
333. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64 (1972) (emphasis added).
334. Id. (emphasis added).
335. [d. at 68.
336. Parkerv. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 586 (1978) (emphasis added).
337. Id. at 596 (quoting Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531
(197 2».
338. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218,3231 (2010).
339. Id. at 3229.
340. Lemley et aI., supra note 3, at 1317.
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subject matter, is really a judicial effort to restrict the permissible scope of
patents."34l Kevin Emerson Collins has explicated the nuances concerning
abstract claim scope and abstract claim language scope.342 And Alan L.
Durham has recognized that" [t] he scope of the claim, and its impact on the
progress of the technological arts, is what ultimately condemns it" under §
10l,343 Meanwhile, in the lead up to Mayo, Rebecca S. Eisenberg famously
highlighted the diversity of these approaches. 344
Claim scope's strong effect on the Supreme Court's "abstract ideas"
jurisprudence suggests that it likely plays a similar role in the Court's
assessments of natural "laws," "phenomena," and "products." Indeed, claim
scope was at the core of the Court's recent decisions in Mayo and Myriad. In
Mayo, the Court read its prior case law concerning "abstract ideas" as
"warn [ing] us against upholding patents that claim processes that too
broadly preempt the use of a naturallaw."345 And paralleling its language in
Benson, the Court construed the claims at issue in Mayo as "set[ting] forth in
highly general language. . . all processes that make use of the correlations
after measuring metabolites."34 6 Thus, although the Mayo Court struggled
throughout its opinion to define a "natural law" in order to ground its
decision,347 it simultaneously voiced a simpler concern over the contested
claims' breadth as it had done in its "abstract ideas" cases. And in Myriad, the
Court again recognized that patent eligibility was concerned with claim
scope-"imped[ing] the flow of information that might permit, indeed spur,
invention"348-while simultaneously characterizing the claims as "concerned
primarily with the information contained in the genetic sequence, not with the
specific chemical composition of a particular molecule."349 Thus, although
the Myriad Court rooted its decision in the "naturalness" of isolated genomic
DNA as opposed to cDNA, it, too, expressed simpler, normative concerns
about claim breadth.

341. Burk & Lemley, supra note 246, at 1642.
342. Collins, Bilski and the Ambiguity, supra note 122, at 51 ("Critically-and this point is
often overlooked-abstraction in the language used to delineate the scope of a claim can be
independent of abstraction in the individual embodiments of an invention that are described
by the claim language.").
343. Alan L. Durham, The Paradox of "Abstract Ideas. "2011 UTAH L. REv. 797. 814.
344. Eisenberg. supra note 3, at 56-61.
345. Mayo Collaborative Sen'S. v. Prometheus Labs .• Inc .• 132 S. Ct. 1289. 1294 (2012)
(emphasis added).
346. Id. at 1302 (emphasis added). Compare id.• with Parker v. Flook. 437 U.S. 584. 586
(1978) (noting that the "patent claims cover any use of [the applicant's) formula for updating
the value of an alarm limit" (emphasis added».
347. E.g., Mayo. 132 S. Ct. at 1297-98 (comparing physical "principles" to "laws of nature");
id. at 1298-99 (mathematical equations); id. at 1302 (statistical relationships).
348. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics. Inc .• 133 S. Ct. 2107. 2116 (2013)
(alteration in original) (quoting Mayo. 132 S. Ct. at 1305).
349. Id. at 2118 (first emphasis added).
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Even prior to these cases, a number of scholars noted the potential for
claim scope to bridge "abstract ideas" and "natural laws," "phenomena," and
"products." Tun:Jen Chiang, in particular, has argued that patent eligibility's
prohibition on applications directed to "abstract ideas" and "laws of nature"
"are one and the same in purpose and effect and are simply limits on the
scope of patents."350 Similarly, Efthimios Parasidis struggled with uniformly
combining the two doctrines, but did suggest a hybrid framework for the
two, complete with a binary decision-tree. 351 And, in Life After Bilski, Lemley,
Risch, Sichelman, and Wagner likened "a claim to an abstract idea [to] a
claim to a product of nature: not limited to real-world applications of
human inventiveness, and thus ineligible for patenting."35 2
At the same time, distinguishing merely broad patent claims from ones
so broad they render themselves ineligible for patent protection remains a
difficult task. And while precisely resolving the contours of that question
remains outside the scope of this Article, the best proposal thus far-the one
proposed by Lemley, Risch, Sichelman, and Wagner-has identified five
factors important to that inquiry: the generative potential of the claimed
invention; the nature of invention in the industry; the pace of innovation in
the field; the number of disclosed embodiments relative to the breadth of
the claims; and the difference between the claimed invention and the prior
art.353 In the aftermath of Myriad, Sichelman has recently demonstrated the
fruitfulness of applying these factors to the Court's traditional "natural"
terms cases. 354 Sichelman argued that the result in Funk Brothers, for
example, could be explained from Varley Sherman Bond's invention's
generative and cumulative nature: Bond's seed inoculant mixture gave rise
to the potential of other, undisclosed noninhibitory inoculant mixtures for
use in an industry-agriculture-famous for building innovation on old
practices. 355 Similarly, the claims in both Mayo and Myriad were predicated
on few embodiments in the context of highly generative and rapidly
developing technologies. 356
Localizing claim scope to patent eligibility-and away from
philosophically troublesome attempts to define what "natural" truly meansprovides a substantially clearer and more workable understanding of the
prohibition on patenting natural "laws," "phenomena," or "products." And it
would appear to solve the greater problems with natural complexity'S effect
on cabining patentable subject matter. It would not be subject to the current

350.
351.
(2010).
352.
353.
354·
355.
356.

Chiang, supra note 3, at 1381 n.148.
Efthimios Parasidis, A Uniform Framework for Patent Eligibility, 85 TuL. L. REv. 323, 406--08
Lemley et al., supra note 3, at 1329.
[d. at 1341.
Sichelman, supra note g, at 15.
[d. at 15-16.
[d. at 15-17.
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false equivalency of patent eligibility-that is, that patent claims on all
"natural laws," regardless of their scope, are ineligible-because, unlike
asking whether a patent claim is or is not a natural law, claim scope inquiries
are inherently spectral: the breadth of a claim is an inherently multihued
inquiry. A focus on claim scope would also refocus patent eligibility on claim
language, and not on unarticulated notions of "the invention as a whole,"
because such a focus would presumably pay close attention to specific claim
language. 357 And while such a focus may still cause the doctrine to suffer
from technological specificity, a renewed concern with the patent document
and the absence of the biologically loaded word, "Nature," counsels that
technological specificity is at least less likely to happen. Whether, in making
patent eligibility determinations, courts assess claim scope through the
factors identified by Lemley, Risch, Sichelman, and Wagner, or others, any
mechanistic description of patent eligibility should rely in part on an analysis
of the scope of the contested claims.
b.

The Claims' and Specification'S Relationship to the Prior Art

Both the claims and the specification serve another function:
demarcating the invention's boundaries from the prior art.35 8 The
specification in particular will often include a description of not only how to
make and use the invention, but also why the invention is an important
contribution in its field beyond that of previously existing innovations. 35g
While the invention's relationship with the prior art has not been
traditionally thought of as playing an important role in determining patent
eligibility, the Court's recent trio of cases-Bilski, Mayo, and Myriad-have
increasingly noted patents' relationships to prior art in their respective
fields. In Bilski, the Court noted that the patent's underlying principlecommodities hedging-was "long prevalent in our system of commerce and
taught in any introductory finance class."360 Far from radically reinventing
finance, the procedure taught by the patent application was an older, "basic
concept of ... protecting against risk."3 61 Furthermore, the Court noted that
several elements of the contested claims concerning certain random analysis
techniques were already "well-known" to practitioners. 362 The claims and

357. But see Collins, Bilski and the Ambiguity, supra note 122, at 51 (arguing that the two
inquiries can be separated).
358. See Burke, supra note 326, at 624; Chisum, supra note 328, at 18. But see Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, ISS-91 (1981) (rejecting novelty as a consideration in § 101
determinations) .
359. Chisum, supra note 328, at IS.
360. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218,3231 (2010) (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F·3 d 943,
1013 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader,]., dissenting» (internal quotation marks omitted).
361. Id.
362. Id.
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specification, therefore, did little, if anything, to distinguish the patent's
greater contribution to the field of commodities purchasing.
More recently, in Mayo, the Court repeatedly focused on the fact that
the patent described "well-understood, routine, conventional activity
previously engaged in by researchers in the field."3 63 According to the Court,
the patent's direction to "determine" the particular level of a metabolite in a
patient's blood simply "tells doctors to engage in well-understood, routine,
conventional activity previously engaged in by scientists who work in the
field."3 64 The Court analogized this to the "[p]urely 'conventional or
obvious' '[pre]-solution activity'" at issue in Flook.3 6 S And the Court noted
that "any additional steps consist [ed] of well-understood, routine,
conventional activity already engaged in by the scientific community. "366
These statements, too, expressed the belief that the patent-aside from
simply claiming a "law of nature"-added nothing to the greater medical
diagnostics field at large.
And the Myriad Court remarked that the patented genes were extracted
through "well known laboratory methods" and synthesized according to
"processes similarly well known in the field of genetics."3 67 The Court
specifically noted that "Myriad's patent descriptions highlight the problem
with its claims" in that it "simply detail[ed] the 'iterative process' of [gene]
discovery"-something well known in genetics. 368 This counseled the Court
to characterize "Myriad's principal contribution [as] uncovering the precise
location and genetic sequence," rather than "creating" or "inventing" the
sequences themselves.3 6 9
These recent statements about the claims' and specification's
relationships to their inventions' respective arts evince concern over
granting method patents to inventions accomplished through an art's core
operational techniques-hedging in finance, dosing in medicine, or
sequencing in genetics. In such instances, allowing method patents to
essentially mimic these techniques-even if the particular patented use of
the techniques otherwise met the remaining strictures of the patent
statute-raises the specter of monopolizing the techniques themselves.
Distilled to a truism, claims' and specifications' prior-art demarcating
function concerns itself more with how an invention is accomplished than

363. Mayo Collaborative SelVS. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289. 1294 (2012).
364. Id. at 1298.
365. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Parker v. Flook. 437 U.S. 584. 590
(1978)).
366. Id.
367. Ass'n for Molecular Pathologyv. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107. 2112 (2013).
368. Id. at2117-18.
369. Id. at 2116.
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what an invention is.37° The more a patent relies on "well-understood,
routine, conventional activity previously engaged in by researchers in the
field,"37 1 the more likely the patent will fail for ineligibility.
To be sure, there are several problems with equating claim demarcation
to an invention's field's core operation techniques: it greatly overlaps with
other aspects of patentability, notably obviousness; it may discriminate
against inventions made through trial and error rather than a "flash of
genius," in contravention of the patent statute; and it potentially places an
increased fact-finding burden on the PTO.37 2 But, like tacking claim
language toward scope rather than "abstractness," this approach seems to
avoid the shoals complexity threatens on interpreting natural "laws,"
"phenomena," and "products." It would seem to also avoid the false
equivalency trap because assessing a patent's claims and specification
relative to "well-understood" techniques in its field is not an all-or-nothing
proposition. Such an assessment would also reorient patent eligibility to
claim language rather than scientific philosophy. And far from promoting a
technological bias, the inquiry would allow nuanced, field-by-field
determinations into the invention's place in its particular art. This, too,
would be a marked improvemen t to amorphous definitions of natural "laws,"
"phenomena," and "products."
c.

The Specification's Teaching Function

Lastly, the specification also serves a teaching function, or as defined by
the Federal Circuit, "a 'quid pro quo' in which the public is given 'meaningful
disclosure in exchange for being excluded from practicing the invention for
a limited period of time. "'373 The Federal Circuit's diction, namely"meaningful"-proves rather illuminating. While patent law's other
requirements concerning the specification-written description and
enablement-involve whether the specification's disclosure is sufficient
enough to practice the invention,374 the specification's function in patent
eligibility is tied to whether the disclosure is meaningful enough for the
invention to receive patent protection at all. Here, too, recent patent
eligibility litigation proves instructive. In Mayo, in particular, the Supreme
Court repeatedly described its concern with the contested patent

370. Jacob S. Sherkow, And How: Mayo v. Prometheus and the Method of Invention, 122 YALE
LJ. ONLINE 351,352 (2013) ("Rather than focusing on what the invention is, [this function]
focuses on how the invention is accomplished.").
371. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294.
372. Sherkow, supra note 370, at 354-57.
373. Vniv. of Rochester v. C.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 922 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting
Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Cen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 970 (Fed. CiT. 2002».
374. See 35 V.S.c. § 112(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (requiring that the specification be
written "in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to
which it pertains ... to make and use the same").
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application-and patent applications, in general-as what it presumed to
"tell" others in the field. A fictional attempt by Albert Einstein to patent a
process using "E=mc" in nuclear acceleration failed, in the Court's view,
because it amounted to little more tlIan "telling linear accelerator operators
to refer to the law to determine how much energy an amount of mass has
produced"-a meaningless, even if enabling disclosure.375 A similar fictional
attempt by Archimedes to patent an application of buoyancy with respect to
shipbuilding also failed in the Court's esteem because that "consist[ed] of
simply telling boat builders to refer to that principle in order to determine
whether an object will float."37 6 Analogously, the patent application in Mayo
failed, in part, because even tlIough the specification more than sufficiently
enabled physicians to control drug dosage according to the patent, it did
little more than teach users of the invention to make use of a particular
principle in otherwise "well-understood" techniques. 377
Similarly, in Myriad, tlIe Court repeatedly referenced the shortcomings
of Myriad's specifications-that they detailed Myriad's method of
discovering the genes but nothing more. These disclosures described only
"fairly uniform" approaches to making use of tlIe technology "insofar as any
scientist engaged in the search for a gene would likely have utilized a similar
approach. "378
These concerns with the quality of the specification's disclosure-not
just its sufficiency-focus on whether the specification actually fulfills its
teaching function in a manner worthy of the societal quid pro quo for the
patent grant-whether the disclosure is meaningful to its particular art.
AltlIough the Mayo and Myriad Courts did not ground their decisions in
those terms, tlIeir dicta concerning tlIe patents' specifications highlight the
difference between specifications that teach a meaningful new way of
implementing the claimed invention and those that simply describe variants
on "well-understood, routine, conventional activity."379 In some ways, this
provides an avenue to reinvigorate § 101 's statutory command that all
patented inventions be botlI "new and useful."3 8o A patent specification that
teaches neither new nor useful concepts-even if it makes use of old

375. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297.
376. Id.
377. See id. ("[TJhe 'wherein' clauses simply tell a doctor about the relevant natural laws, at
most adding a suggestion that he should take those laws into account when treating his patient.
That is to say, these clauses tell the relevant audience about the laws while trusting them to use
those laws appropriately where they are relevant to their decision making (rather like Einstein
telling linear accelerator operators about his basic law and then trusting them to use it where
relevant).").
378. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2119-20
(2013) (quoting Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181,203 (S.D.N.Y.
2010».
379. See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298.
380. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
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concepts in a new, useful, and nonobvious way-may, in some cases, run
afoul of patent eligibility. This potentially demonstrates another avenue for
localizing disclosure's teaching requirement to patent eligibility.

3.

Building a Mechanistic Description of Patent Eligibility

The scope of the claims, the claims' and specification's relationship to
the prior art, and the "meaningfulness" of the specification's disclosure all
affect whether a patent application is, or is not, patent eligible. Taken
together, these three functions describe a mechanistic view of patent
eligibility. At these functions' extremes, the inquiry is disjunctive. If a claim's
scope is wildly too broad, the claim will almost certainly be rendered
ineligible under one of the traditional patent eligibility inquiries. If the
invention, as set forth in the claims or described in the specification,
operates perfectly coequal with "well-understood" operational methods in
the invention's field, then it, too, will likely be rendered ineligible. Or, if the
specification's disclosure is so meaningless that it fails to teach its
practitioners anything "new or useful" about its field, its overlying patent
application may fail as well.
At the same time, these factors are not always present at such extremes.
There are, to be sure, close cases. And the precise metrics courts should use
in analyzing these factors is well up to debate. Regarding overly broad claim
scope, the factors proposed by Lemley, Risch, Sichelman, and Wagner do
not appear to be an exhaustive list.3 8t Even those may require a further,
nuanced explanation. 382 Similarly, determining how much the underlying
invention-as defined in the claims or described in the specificationoverlaps with "well-understood" operational techniques in its field may
require a detailed understanding of how to assess how an invention's field
performs research or business. And practically assessing "meaningfulness" of
the specification's contribution to the art will likely require further parsing
by the courts.
But these factors at least provide concrete, legalistic explanations for
the Supreme Court's patent eligibility jurisprudence; mechanistic
descriptions of how the actual components of the patent document
determine patentable subject matter. Like modern understandings of
complex phenomena in the sciences, decomposition and localization here
provide insight into how the poorly articulated, confusing, and seemingly

381. Lemley et ai., supra note 3, at 1341 ("In sum, we believe at least five factors are critical
to a proper scope-based determination for patentable subject matter eligibility under § 101 . . . .
No one factor should dominate; we advocate a contextual, common-law approach. Courts and
scholars are likely to develop other factors as our approach is applied over time.").
382. See Peter Lee, The Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure, 83 WASH. L. REv. 39, 8g (2008)
(analogizing the differences in these approaches as tradeoffs between "analytical rigor" and
"valuable flexibility"); Sichelman, supra note g, at 15-17 (describing some difficulties in
applying these factors to the technologies at issue in Mayo and Myrialf).
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contradictory area of patentable subject matter can be explained by
reference to patents themselves, rather than unrelated discourses into
scientific philosophy. This is one of the principal strengths-not
weaknesses-in decomposition and localization in legal analysis: it
simultaneously roots legal decision-making in concrete identifiable legal
factors while allowing courts the opportunity to engage in the underlying
policy levers regarding technological innovation.3 83
Whether courts, or rather, another legal institution, should be engaging
in such explicit policy determinations for patent eligibility-regarded by
some as simply a threshold test or a "coarse filter" that should be easy to
apply-is another, higher-order question. 384 And given the modern
development of patent law, whether patent eligibility does any useful work
apart from its statutory cousins-novelty, nonobviousness, and
enablement-is another, separate question. 385 But there is little simplicity or
ease in the doctrine as it currently exists, and the Supreme Court has
recently and explicitly rejected arguments to abandon it.3 86 Few would argue
that the Court's repeated invocation of philosophically pregnant terms, like
"law of nature," rests on firm, principled, legal analysis. An honest
acknowledgment of how these factors affect patent eligibility, if nothing else,
frees legal decision makers from grappling with the complexity of natural
"laws," "phenomena," or "products."
Applying this mechanistic framework to Mayo and Myriad, the Court's
two recent patent eligibility cases, one can reach similar, normatively
desirable outcomes without reference to natural "laws," "phenomena," or
"products." As recently detailed by Sichelman, the first function, claim
383. See Burk Be Lemley, supra note 246, at 1642-58 (describing patentable subject matter
through "policy levers" rather than legal formalism); Lemley et aI., supra note 3, at 1327 ("Lack
of rigidity is not inherently bad; we suggest a flexible, factors-based test ourselves. But because
gatekeeping rules attempt to draw conceptual lines around classes of technology with unclear
boundaries-instead of using the policy-based factors that should drive patentable subject
matter determinations-the result is a set of tests that overexclude and underexclude in a costly
and haphazard way.").
384. Compare, e.g., Anna B. Laakmann, An Explicit Policy Lever far Patent Scope, 19 MICH.
TELECOMM. Be TECH. L. REv. 43, 6(H>I (2012) (arguing that courts should engage in explicit
policy determinations for patent eligibility), and Lemley et a1., supra note 3, at 1327 (same), and
Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103
COLUM. L. REv. 1035, 1040-41 (2003) (arguing that both courts and the PTO should), with
Mary Mitchell Be Dana A. Remus, Interstitial Exclusivities After Association for Molecular
Pathology, 109 MICH. L. REv. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 34, 39 (2010) (arguing that only Congress
should), and Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron Deference far the
PTO, 54 WM. Be MARYL. REv. 1959,2008-12 (2013) (arguing that the PTO, rather than the
Federal Circuit, should).
385. Risch, supra note 3, at 591-92 (advocating for the elimination of patent eligibility by
using other areas of the patent statute).
386. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1304 (2012)
(rejecting the government's arguments to abandon patent eligibility in light of patent law's
evolution) .
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breadth, likely weighs heavily against the validity of the claims at issue in
Myriad but would appear to allow them in Mayo.3 87 In Myriad, the scope of
the claim likely prohibited a great deal of follow-on innovation and
encompassed a number of practical applications for the gene, only some of
which were disclosed in the specification. 388 In addition, the invention-a
discrete application of information in a rapidly advancing field-was
potentially the subject of significant improvement by future researchers.3 89
Indeed, since the Myriad patents on BRCAr and BRCA2 were filed in 1998,
genetic sequencing technologies have completely revolutionized.39° In Mayo,
however, the claims were relatively narrow and likely did not hinder followon innovation. 39' Rather, they appeared more like incremental
improvements, with few applications, in an otherwise cumulatively
developing field.39" Since the Prometheus Laboratories patents were filed in
1998, there has been little improvement in honing the appropriate dosage
of thiopurine drugs to treat Crohn's and inflammatory bowel disease.393
The second function-distinguishing the claims and specification from
the prior art-would seem to counsel against the validity of both the Mayo
and Myriad patents. Both were directed to core operational· techniques in
their respective fields-drug dosing in Mayo and sequencing in Myria~that
added only an informational component. That is, the operational
techniques described in the Mayo patents, "administering" the drug, and
"determining" its metabolite, were well known in the prior art. Indeed, the
Mayo patents themselves described them as such.394 The only element
distinguishing the contested claims was the particular dosage threshold
itself. Similarly, the operational techniques of many of the claims in the

387. Sichel man, supra note g, at 15-17.
388. Id.
389. Id. at 15-16.
390. See Michael 1. Metzker, Sequencing Technologies-The Next Generation, 11 NATURE
REVIEWS GENETICS 31, 31 (2010).
391. Sichelman, supra note 9, at 15.
392. Id. at 15-16.
393. See 1. Chouchana et aI., Review Arlicle: The Benefits of Pharmacogenetics fcrr Improving
Thiopurine Therapy in Inflammatory Bowel Disease, 35 ALIMENTARY PHARMACOLOGY &
THERAPEUTICS 15,21 (2012) (listing, in a review of recent literature concerning thiopurine
dosage, remarkably similar range dosage thresholds to those in Prometheus's patents).
Interestingly, however, a good deal of follow-on innovation concerning thiopurine
treatment has recently come about using molecular diagnostics-the same technology at issue
in the Myriad case. See, e.g., id. at 24-27 (discussing testable pharmacogenetic factors
contributing to thiopurine metabolism).
394. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 B2 col. 8, II. 37-43 (filed Apr. 8, 1999) ("Previous
studies suggested that measurement of 6-MP metabolite levels can be used to predict clinical
efficacy and tolerance to azathioprine or 6-MP. However, it was unknown what concentrations
of 6-MP metabolites correlated with optimized therapeutic efficacy or with tOXicity." (citations
omitted».
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Myriad patents were also well-known to researchers at the time.395 And again,
the only element distinguishing the contested claims from the known
operational techniques was the particular sequence itself. The proximity
between the Mayo and Myriad patents and core operational techniques in
their fields strongly counsels in favor of finding the contested claims invalid.
The last function-the meaningfulness of the specification-likely cuts
the other way, however. Both cases' patents provided not merely sufficient
but meaningful information concerning their fields. As detailed in the Mayo
patents, "it was unknown what concentrations of [thiopurine] metabolites
correlated ·with optimized therapeutic efficacy or with toxicity."39 6 The
patents expressly and clearly provided such information: less than 230
picomoles of thiopurine metabolites per titer of blood indicated a need to
increase the dosage; greater than 400 picomoles of thiopurine metabolites
per titer of blood indicated a need to decrease the dosage. 397 This
information was both "new and useful" to practitioners in the field.3g 8
Similarly, the specifications of the Myriad patents were quite meaningful with
respect to detecting whether a particular patient possessed an increased risk
for breast cancer. If a patient possessed the sequence variants disclosed in
the patent specification, their risk for developing breast cancer increased by
a calculable amount-also disclosed in the patents. 399 If a patient did not,
their risk was presumed to be the same as that found in the general
population. 4OO This type of analysis, applied to breast cancer, was both "new
and useful" for clinical purposes,4 01 and counsels against the Court's
invalidity determination.
This mechanistic-functional analysis of Mayo and Myriad demonstrates
the principal benefit to the approach: it compels similar, normatively
desirable results to those reflected in the Court's opinions without relying
on philosophical language. The Mayo patents, which prior to the Supreme

395. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,693,473 col. 30, II. 41-46 (filed June 7, 1995) ("Preferred
embodiments relating to methods for detecting BRCAI or its mutations include enzyme linked
immunosorbent assays (ELISA), radioimmunoassays (RIA), immunoradiometric assays (IRMA)
and immunoenzymatic assays (lEMA), including sandwich assays using monoclonal and/or
polyclonal antibodies.").
396. '623 B2 Patent col. 8, II. 40-42.
397. Id. at col. 20, II. 10-25.
398. See C. Cuffari et aI., Quantitation of 6-Thioguanine in Peripheral Blood Leukocyte DNA in
Crohn's Disease Patients on Maintenance 6-Mercaptopunne Therapy, 74 CANADIAN]' PHYSIOLO(,'Y &
PHARMACOLOGY 580, 582 (1996) (discussing the development of "an assay to measure 6TG
levels in leukocyte DNA").
399· '473 Patent passim.
400.
Id. passim.
401.
See Elizabeth B. Claus et aI., Genetic Analysis of Breast Cancer in the Cancer and Steroid
Hormone Study, 48 AM.]. HUM. GENETICS 232, 232 (1991) (remarking that, at the time, this was
the largest data set collected to study genetic risk profiles for breast cancer).
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Court's decision were subject to a nuanced analysis by commentators,4 0•
receive an equally nuanced portrait here. Their claims do not appear overly
broad, nor do their specifications disclose meaningless improvements, but
their contributions above and beyond core operational techniques for
diagnostics border on zero. This clearly and strongly factored into the
Court's opinion in Mayo with its repeated reference to "well-understood,
routine, conventional activity previously engaged in by researchers in the
field"4°3-stronger, perhaps, than concerns regarding the breadth of the
patents' claims or the meaningfulness of the specifications' contributions.
The Myriad patents, however, received almost universal censure from
commentators and scientists alike.404 Accordingly, the mechanistic analysis
presented here condemns those patents under both the claim-breadth and
prior-art demarcating functions. In this way, patent eligibility can replace
attempts to define natural "laws," "phenomena," and "products" with the
sort of legal analysis courts are typically tasked to do. Without it, it would
seem, patent eligibility may remain needlessly complex.
CONCLUSION

Patent law's traditional concern over patents on "principles" or
"abstractions" has been replaced with incantations against "laws of nature,"
"natural phenomena," and "products of nature." These words, however, are
meaningless as both legal terms of art and as scientific concepts. Since their
adoption, the Supreme Court has provided no framework or set of factors to
assess whether a patent's claims come within those terms' ambit. And worse
yet, a branch of scientific philosophy, known as natural complexity, stresses
the cognitive difficulties imposed on crafting general rules about a multielemental, multi-variable, interconnected concept of Nature. The Court's
continued reliance on this legally and scientifically meaningless terminology
explains some of the difficulties the doctrine of patent eligibility suffers from
today, including falsely equating all natural concepts as unpatentable "laws"
or "phenomena," marginalizing claim language, and effecting an antibiotechnology bias.
Today, after years of doctrinal accretion, patent eligibility has itself
become complex. Consequently, distilling patent eligibility into a simple

402. See Lemley et al., supra note 3, at 1344 ("[T]he claim was to very specific
measurements of a particular drug. Like Metabolite, Pmmetheus involves an application of the
natural principles discovered by the patentee. It is not generative, nor will it unduly bar future
inventors. If, however, this claim were expanded to cover all drugs without any specific
measurements, then it would be an abstract idea.").
403. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012).
404- See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews & Jordan Paradise, Gene Patents: The Need for Bioethies Scrutiny
and Legal Change, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'y L. & ETHICS 403, 404 (2005) (criticizing Myriad's
patents on public health grounds); Aaron S. Kesselheim et ai., Gene Patenting-The Suprli'YM Court
Finally Speaks, 369 NEW ENG.]. MED. 869 (2013) (same for research preemption purposes).

1196

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99:1137

formula-without doing significant, and politically untenable harm to the
Supreme Court's patent jurisprudence-remains challenging. Complexity
theorists, however, have recognized twin strategies to developing
"mechanistic" descriptions of complex phenomena: "decomposition,"
breaking a system down into cognitively simple subparts, and "localization,"
mapping the functions of those subparts to the system as a whole. While this
may appear inapplicable to the law, many other complex areas of
jurisprudence use this methodology by breaking down high-order,
generalized questions into separate "factors" or "prongs" that map to the
law's substantive purposes. Patent eligibility could be similarly simplified by
decomposing the inquiry into assessing how the functions of each
component part of the patent document-the claims and the
specification-localize to patent eligibility's policy goals. In particular, courts
should consider the scope of the patent's claims, the claims' and the
specification's relationship to the prior art, and whether the specification
provides a meaningful-not merely sufficient-disclosure of a "new and
useful" technology. This analysis has several advantages to the current state
of affairs: it frees patent eligibility from its focus on scientifically meaningless
terms; it is likely to be politically palatable to both the Supreme Court and
Congress; and it does not readily suffer from some of the difficulties patent
eligibility currently poses on patent law, generally. Such a test, regardless as
to how it is ultimately crafted, is unlikely to be without its own uncertainties.
But without decomposition and localization, patent eligibility will likely
remain needlessly complex.

